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BANKING REGULATION:
ITS HISTORY AND FUTURE
JERRY W. MARKHAW
I. INTRODUCTION
The current regulatory structure for banking services in the
United States is not the result of any grand design or reasoned
blueprint. Instead, it represents a set of accumulated responses to a
long history of financial crises, scandals, happenstance, personalities
and compromises among a broad and competing array of industry
and governmental units. This article will trace the history of the
growth and regulation of banking services in the United States.
That history will show how the existing regulatory structure was
developed in response to demands of the Civil War and a populist
crusade against the "money trust." That effort reached its zenith
with the New Deal legislation of the 1930s, but began to fall apart as
financial services consolidated. The article will then show how the
financial services industries (banking, insurance, securities and de-
rivatives) began to merge in their product base while at the same
time separating on a fault line between institutional and retail cus-
tomers.' After reviewing this history, the article will discuss the fu-
" Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
1. For the purposes of this article, financial services are defined to include bank-
ing, securities, derivatives and insurance. This definition is not exact. There are a
broad array of financial services providers that do not fit precisely in such boxes, such
as finance companies, installment sales financing operations, sub-prime lenders, pay-
check cashing operations and even pawn shops. Sub-prime lenders, for example, pro-
vide loans to high risk borrowers, including individuals with prior credit problems.
See Karen Hube, In the Wild West of Subprinre Lending, Borrowers Have to Dodge Many
Bullets, WALL ST. J., Mar. 18,1998, at Cl; JoHN GUNTHER, SUB-PRIME MORTGAGE LoANs
(Nov. 1997). Sub-Prime Funding Corp. General Information Website. Paycheck cash-
ing operations are widespread in lower income areas. Such services are needed. In
March of 1998, more than one in eight families in the United States did not have a bank
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ture of banking regulation under the functional regulatory structure
adopted by the recently adopted Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act for finan-
cial services holding companies.
II. TrE BANKING INDUSTRY & ITS HISTORY
A. The "BUSes"
Banking in America and its regulation has a long and tangled
history. Robert Morris, the Superintendent of Finance for the Con-
tinental Congress, laid the groundwork for the existing structure
during the Revolution. Assisting Morris in that effort was Alexan-
der Hamilton who, as a reader of Adam Smith's The Wealth of Na-
tions that was published in 1776, became an advocate of a central
bank that would guide and help build America into a world power.2
account. See Richard A. Oppel, Jr., The Stepchildren of Banking, N. Y. TIMES, Mar. 26,
1999, at Cl. Finance and installment sales companies are other entities outside the
traditional demarcation lines of the financial services industry. They are of no small
importance. For example, Household International, a large finance company that was
started in 1878, purchased Beneficial Financial Corp. in an $8.6 billion transaction in
April of 1998. See HoUSEHOLD INTERNAIONAL, INC., 1997 ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT
(1998); Business This Week, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 11, 1998, at 5; Jeff Bailey, Household Is
Keen to Acquire Beneficial, Whose Shares Leap On News It Is For Sale, WALL ST. J., Feb. 18,
1998, at C23. Another financial services firm of uncertain classification is GE Capital
Services, which is America's largest finance company. See THOMASF. O'BOYLE, ATANY
COSr: JACKWELCH, GENERAL ELECrIC AND THE PURSUrrOF PROFITS 88 (1998). GE Capi-
tal Services had twenty-eight businesses in November of 1998. See Claudia H.
Deutsch, G.E. Division May Buy Unit of Japan Bank, N. Y. TIMES, Nov. 30,1998, at Al.
They included home mortgages, credit cards, reinsurance, equipment leasing and cor-
porate financing. See Matt Murray & Joann S. Lublin, Wendt, Head of GE Capital, to Step
Down, WALL ST. J., Dec. 8, 1998, at A3. GE Capital Corporation was also selling life
insurance. See RON CHERNOW, THE DEATH OF THE BANKER 71 (1997).
The automobile finance company is another institution that operates on the
boundary lines of finance. The Ford Motor Credit Company ("FMC") is the country' s
largest automotive finance company. It also offers a Ford Money Market Account.
Customers may access their account status online, and they can obtain advance on-line
credit approval in order to buy a car. FMC is heavily involved in the money market to
support its activities. Among other things, FMC is one of the world' s largest issuers
of corporate debt securities, it offers commercial paper through the Internet, and FMC
was named the "most professional end-user of derivatives" in 1997. See FORD CREDrr,
1997 ANNUAL REPORT (1997) at 13, 20-21. The General Motors Acceptance Corp.
("GMAC") announced in June of 1999 that it was purchasing the commercial finance
unit of the Bank of New York for $1.8 billion. GMAC was already the largest commer-
cial lender in the United States. See Gregory L. White & Paul Beckett, GMAC to Buy
Bank of New York Finance Unit for $1.8 Billion, WALL ST. J., June 9,1999, at A4.
2. See ROBERTIRVINGWARSHOW, ALEXANDERHAMILTON: FIRSTAMEICAN BUSINESS
MAN 66 (1931).
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Hamilton proposed such an institution in a letter to Robert Morris
that was written while the Continental Army was in winter quar-
ters.3 Morris set that plan in motion through the "Bank of North
America," which began operations in 1782 and aided the Continen-
tal army during some of its darker hours.'
Alexander Hamilton, when he became the first Secretary of
the Treasury, reported to Congress on measures needed to establish
public credit in 1790. He recommended the creation of a "National
Bank" that would become the "Bank of the United States."5 Hamil-
ton used the Bank of England as the model for the creation of this
bank.' Hamilton wanted the Bank of the United States ("BUS") to
be a private bank. Congress approved Hamilton's recommenda-
tions and authorized the creation of this national bank in 1791.7 The
3. See id. See also ALBERTS. BOLLES, TH FINANCIALHISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
92 (D. Appleton & Company 1896); BRAY HAMMOND, BANKS AND POLmcs IN AMERICA
FROM THE REVOLUTION TO TE CIVIL WAR 41 (1957).
4. See R.K. MOULTON, LEGISLATIVE AND DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE BANKS OF
THE UNITED STATES 2 (New York, G. & G. Carvill 1834). The Bank of North America
was the successor to the Pennsylvania Bank. See id. See also BURTON ALVA KONKLE,
THOMAS WILLING AND THE FIRsT AMERICAN FINANCIAL SYsTEM 102 (1937). The govern-
ment owned five-eighths of the stock of the Bank of North America. See BURTON ALVA
KONKLE, THOMAS WILLING AND THE FIusr AMERICAN FINANCIAL SYSTEM 104 (1937).
One critic has suggested that the contributions to the war effort by the Bank of
America were small. See WILLIAM M. GOUGE, A SHORT HISTORY OF PAPER MONEY AND
BANKING IN THE UNITED STATES INCLUDING AN ACCOUNT OF PROviNCAL AND CONTINEN-
TAL PAPER MONEY TO WHICH IS PREFIXED AN INQUIRY INTO THE PRINCIPLES OF THE SYSTEM
(Part 11) 32 (T.W. Ustick 1833).
5. See MOULTON, supra note 4, at 3. Hamilton's report asserted that "a National
Bank is an institution of primary importance to the prosperous administration of the
finances, and would be of the greatest utility in the operations connected with the
support of the public credit." See A. BARTON HEPBURN, HISTORY OF COINAGE AND CUR-
RENCYNTHE UNrED STATS ANDTHEPERENNiAL CONTESrFORSOUND MONEY 624(1968).
6. See HAMMOND, supra note 3, at 3.
7. The chartering of the Bank of the United States created a controversy over
whether Congress had such an implied power under the constitution. The cabinet of
George Washington split on that issue. Thomas Jefferson, James Madison and Ed-
mund Randolph were opposed, while Alexander Hamilton and General Henry Knox,
the Secretary of War, were in favor. Jefferson, in particular, was staunchly against the
chartering of the Bank of the United States. He believed that "banking establishments
are more dangerous to our liberties than standing armies." See WILLIAMF. HIxsON,
TRIUMH OF THE BANKERS, MONEY AND BANKING IN THE EIGHTEENTH AND NINETEENTH
CENTURIES 94 (1993). Apparently convinced by Jefferson's arguments, President Wash-
ington asked Madison to prepare a veto message on the bank legislation. But Wash-
ington did not issue that message. Instead, he accepted Hamilton's views and allowed
the bank to be chartered. See JOSEPH STANCLIFFEDAVIS, ESSAYS INTHEEARLIERHISTORY
OF AMERICAN CORPORATIONS 12-14 (1965); JAMEsW. GILBART, THE HISTORY OF BANKING
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BUS was not the only bank in America. A number of banks were
created in the years following the Revolution. Between 1782 and
1837, over 700 banks sprang up in the United States.8
Since there was no national currency, the notes issued by the
banks began circulating as a substitute. It was sometimes an unsta-
ble currency. As John Adams noted in 1799, "the fluctuations of our
circulating medium have committed greater depredations upon the
property of honest men than all the French piracies." 9 The states
began to take some rudimentary efforts to regulate banking. Mas-
sachusetts and New Hampshire prohibited unincorporated banks in
1799. New York imposed a similar measure in 1804. These prohi-
bitions were based on the English Bubble Act of 1720, which had
sought to curb speculative enterprises by requiring businesses to
obtain a government approved charter before stock could be sold to
the public or notes issued."
Despite the competition, the BUS continued as the premier
bank. It had branches in Boston, New York, Washington, Norfolk,
Charleston, Savannah and New Orleans.'2 Ironically, the success of
the BUS spelled its doom. It was a threat to the state banks that
were appearing in ever increasing numbers, and Congress refused
to renew its charter in 1811.13 The expiration of the bank's Congres-
sional charter created a vacuum that was soon filled by the state
banks." Over 120 new state banks were chartered between 1811
N AMERICA 5-7 (1967); HAMMOND, supra note 3, at 117-18; ROBERTV. REMINI, HENRY
CLAYSTATESMAN FOR THE UNION 68 (1991) [hereinafter REMINI 11; WARSHOW, supra note
2, at 135-36.
8. See J. VAN.FENTERmAXER, THE DEVELOPMENToF AMERICAN COMMERCIALBANK-
ING: 1782-1837, at 4-5 (1965).
9. See HAMMOND, supra note 3, at 36.
10. See THOMAS FLEMING, DUEL, ALEXANDER HAMILTON, AARON BURR AND THE FU-
TURE OF AMERICA 214 (1999); BENJAMIN J. KLEBANER, COMMERCIAL BANKING IN THE
UNITED STATES: A HISTORY 11 (1974).
11. See HAMMOND, supra note 3, at 159. See also GILBART, supra note 7, at 42. Bank
failures were beginning to surface as another threat to the system. Apparently, the
first bank to fail in the United States was in Rhode Island in 1809. See KLEBANER, supra
note 10, at 48.
12. See GERALD C. FISCHER, AMERICAN BANKING STRUCTURE 11 (1968); DAVID
KINLEY, NATIONAL MONETARY COMMISSION, THE INDEPENDENTTREASURY OF THE UNITED
STATES AND ITS RELATIONS TO THE BANKS OF THE COUNTRY, 61st Cong. 2d Sess., S. Doc.
No. 587, at 11 (1910).
13. See REMINI 1, supra note 7, at 139.
14. See id.
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and 1815."5 Difficulties encountered during the War of 1812, how-
ever, resulted in the creation of a new Bank of the United States. 6
The states did not react favorably toward this institution. Fourteen
states passed laws that tried to prevent the second BUS from collect-
ing its debts. Six states tried to tax the branches of the second BUS
in their borders." In McCulloch v. Maryland,8 however, the Supreme
Court held that a Maryland tax directed against BUS violated the
Constitution. That ruling freed BUS from restrictive state regula-
tions.
A panic in 1819 was blamed by some on the BUS's conserva-
tive lending practices.' The Bank engendered further hostility
when it foreclosed on large amounts of real estate after the panic.20
The appointment of Nicholas Biddle as President of the BUS in 1823
restored its stature.2 ' Biddle pursued an aggressive program of ex-
pansion, and the BUS had twenty-five branches by 1830.22 The BUS
was then making profits of more than $3 million a year. It was con-
ducting some twenty percent of banking business in the United
States. 23
The BUS became the center of a political battle that has re-
verberated through the centuries. Andrew Jackson viewed the bank
to be a "monster."24 Henry Clay, his political rival, wanted to make
the BUS's charter a political issue to further Clay's own Presidential
15. See BOLLES, supra note 3, at 261.
16. See CHARLES SELLERS, THE MARKET REVOLUTION, JACKSONIAN AMERICA, 1815-
1846 71 (1991).
17. See REMI 1, supra note 7, at 198.
18. 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
19. See KNLEY, supra note 12, at 19. The panic in 1819 brought "a catastrophe that
sent cotton prices tumbling, plunging merchants and planters into bankruptcy, drying
up credit, and spreading despair and suffering through every level of society." See
ROBERT LECKIE, FROM SEATO SHINING SEA, FROMTHE WAR OF 1812 TO THE MEXICAN WAR,
THE SAGA OF AMERICA'S ExPANSION 497 (1993).
20. See JOHN SPENcERBASSET, THE LIFE OF ANDREW JACKSON 586 (1911); SELLERS,
supra note 16, at 138.
21. See RALPH C.H. CATrERALL, THESECOND BANKOFTHEUNTED STATES 93 (1903).
22. See KLEBANER, supra note 10, at 13; JOHN JAY KNOX, A HISORY OF BANKING IN
THE UNrrED STATES 63 (1900);.
23. See KNox, supra note 22, at 63.
24. See M. GRACE MADELEINE, MONETARY AND BANKING THEORIES OF JACKSONIAN
DEMOCRACY 41-42 (1943).
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ambitions." Clay and his supporters, who included Daniel Web-
ster, had control of both the House and the Senate. They rechar-
tered the Second Bank in 1832.26 Jackson responded by vetoing that
legislation.27 His veto was upheld, and he ordered the government's
deposits to be removed from the BUS to state banks that were politi-
cally aligned with Jackson. They were derisively referred to by
Jackson's opponents as the "pet" banks.28 At Clay's urging, Jackson
was censured by the Senate for his removal order, but Clay suffered
a severe defeat when the Senate voted to expunge that censure from
Senate records in 1837.29
B. After the "BUSes"
The struggle over the BUS set back the effort to create a cen-
tral banking authority until the next century, and its demise led to a
"bank mania."3" The number of state banks more than doubled be-
tween 1829 and 1837.31 New York furthered their growth by allow-
ing banks to be incorporated without requiring a special charter
25. See KNOX, supra note 22, at 62-63. See also, JAMES L. BUGG, JR., JACKSONIAN DE-
MOCRACY MYTH OR REALry? 46 (1962).
26. See A.S. COLYAR, LIFE AND TIMES OF ANDREWJAcKSON 646 (1904). See generally,
REMm 1, supra note 7, at 397-9. Thomas Hart Benton, whose financial background
included service as a bank director and an expulsion from the University of North
Carolina for stealing, was Jackson's strongest Senate supporter in the struggle over the
BUS. See LEONARD C. HELDERMAN, NATIONAL AND STATE BANKS: A STUDY OF THEIR ORI-
GINS 40 (1931); SELLERS, supra note 16, at 290.
27. See GILBART, supra note 7, at 20.
28. See BASSETr, supra note 20, at 631; KLEBANER, supra note 10, at 44. The pet
banks of Andrew Jackson initially numbered seven but were increased to twenty-two
by the end of 1833 and to ninety over the next three years. See Robert V. REMINI, THE
LIFE OF ANDREWJACKSON 264 (1988); ROBERT V. REMINI, DANIEL WEBSTER, THE MAN AND
HIs TIME 400, n. 7 (1997).
29. See BA5=, supra note 20,at 653-55; WLLAM MACDONALD, THE AMERICAN
NATION: A HISTORY, JACKSONIAN DEMOCRACY 1829-1837 239 (1906). For a general dis-
cussion of the fight over the rechartering of the second Bank of the United States, see
CLAUDE G. BOWERS, THE PARTY BATrLES OF THE JACKSON PERIOD (1922).
Federal legislation was passed in 1846 that created an independent Treasury sys-
tem. See KnqL, supra note 12, at 50. Jackson's pet state banks were then replaced by a
number of sub-treasuries. See ELLISPAXSON OBERHOLTZER, JAY COOKE: FINANCIER OF THE
CIvIL WAR 81 (1907); BRAY HAMMOND, SOVEREIGNTY AND AN EMITY PURSE, BANKS AND
POLTICS IN THE CIVIL WAR 20,23 (1970).
30. See MADELEINE, supra note 24, at 69.
31. See MACDONALD, supra note 29, at 117.
[Vol. 4
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from the legislature. Several other states followed this "free bank-
ing" approach to chartering.32 More affirmative regulation was also
being adopted.33 New York set up a bank supervisory authority in
1829, and a more formal banking commission was created in New
York to oversee banks after the Panic of 1837."4 Reserve require-
ments were imposed. The first insurance for bank depositors ap-
pears to have been developed by the New York safety fund law that
was passed in 1829.36 It was not successful.37
By the time of the Civil War, America's principal currency
was the bank notes that were being issued by the state banks, which
fluctuated in value according to their quality. Thousands of bank
notes were then in circulation, many of which were counterfeit.38
32. See KLEBANER, supra note 10, at 9. Banking continued to be viewed with sus-
picion in some states. The Texas Constitution prohibited banks until 1904. Iowa, Ar-
kansas, Oregon and California prohibited banks before the Civil War. See ANTHONY
SAMPSON, THE MONEY LENDERS: BANKERS IN A WORLD OF TURMOIL 48 (1981); DAVID T.
GILcHRisT & W. DAvID LEwIS, EcONOMnc CHANGE IN THE CIVIL WAR ERA 23(1965).
33. After the Panic of 1837, several states adopted legislation that made bank
stockholders liable for twice the amount of the par value of their shares in the event of
a bank's failure. This was double liability. See REPoRTOFTHEMONETARY COMMISSION OF
THE INDIANAPOLIS CONVENTION 240-41 (U. Chicago Press 1898). New York adopted
such a measure in 1846. See HENRY CLEws, TWENTY-EIGHTYEARS IN WALL STREET 84-85
j. S. Ogilvie 1887). Double liability would also be included in the National Banking
Act that was passed during the Civil War. See HELDERMAN, supra note 26, at 154. See
generally Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Double Liabilih of Bank Shareholders:
History & Implications, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 31 (1992) (providing analysis of the
double liability standard of bank shareholders between the 1860's and the 1920's).
34. The banking commission was authorized to inspect banks chartered in New
York four times a year. See VAN FENSTERMAKER, supra note 8, at 15-16; KLEBANER, supra
note 10, at 41.
35. See KNOX, supra note 22, at 419; Larry E. Schweikart, Banking in the American
South, 1836-1865 126-127 (1983) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Califor-
nia) (on file with the University of California Library). States began requiring banks to
report on their financial positions in the early 1800s. See KLEBANER, supra note 10, at 41.
Massachusetts passed such a statute in 1803. See KNOx, supra note 22, at 360. The
New York legislature required its banks to make semi-annual reports on their condi-
tion in 1838. Five years later, quarterly reports were required. See REPORT OF THE
MONETARY COMMISSION OF THE INDIANAPOUS CONVENTION 357 (U. Chicago Press 1898).
36. See HEPBURN, supra note 5, at 93; REPORT OFTHE MONETARY COMMISSION OF THE
INDIANAPOLIS CONVENTION 239 (U. Chicago Press 1898)
37. See KLEBANER, supra note 10, at 23.
38. James Haxby issued a STANDARD CATALOG OF OBSOLEE UNrIED STATES BANK
NOTES, 1782-1866. This catalog identified some 72,000 bank notes. See Lawrence In-
grassia, Exchequered Past, WALLST. J., Jan. 13,1998, at1. See DAVIDR. JOHNSON, ILLEGAL
TENDER, COUNTERFEITING AND THE SECRET SERVICE IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA ix
(1995). Publications were available that identified counterfeit or altered bank notes.
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The Union government created the "greenback" and made it legal
tender as a way to fund its expenditures during the Civil War.39
This became our national currency, and the creation of the national
banks was closely tied to its success. 41 The federal government's
elimination of state bank notes as a currency was accomplished
through a two-step process. The first step was to create a national
banking system. The second step was to tax the state bank notes out
of existence. The first of these measures was taken with the passage
of the National Banking Act that became law on February 25,1863.4"
It authorized the creation of "national" banks that would be regu-
lated by the federal government. The Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency was directed to administer this legislation.42 This re-
sulted in a "dual" system of banking regulation between the states
and the federal government.43
C. The Birth of the Fed
The bank clearing houses were a key part of the banking sys-
John Thompson's Bank Note Detector was one of the more popular of these services. See
JOHN DONALD WILSON, THE CHASE: THE CHASE MANHATrAN BANK, N.A., 1945-1985 9
(1986) [hereinafter WILSON]; OBERHOLTZER, supra note 29, at 344.
39. See BRAYHAMMOND, SOVEREIGNTYANDANEMFIYPURSE, BANKS AND POLITICS IN
THE CIVIL WAR 239 (1970).
40. The greenback was made "legal tender" in order to assure its acceptance. The
Supreme Court considered the legality of this requirement after the Civil War in the
so-called "legal tender" cases. In Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. 603 (1869), the Court
held that the legal tender requirement was unconstitutional. The Chief Justice who
wrote the majority opinion for the Court in the Hepburn case was none other than
Salmon P. Chase, the former Secretary of the Treasury who had administered the in-
troduction of the greenbacks and the legal tender requirement into the American econ-
omy during the Civil War. Later, after a change in Justices and a little Court packing,
the Attorney General of the United States sought argument on the legal tender issue
once again in a case entitled Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. 457 (1870). In a five to four decision
in that case, with Chief Justice Chase dissenting, the Supreme Court overruled its deci-
sion in Hepburn and held that the legal tender requirement could be properly imposed
by Congress under the Constitution. See generally, ALBERTS. BOLLES, THE FINANCIAL
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES FROM 1861 TO 1885 255-257 (Augustus M. Kelley 1969)
(1886); MILTON FRIEDMAN & ANNA JACOBSON SCHwARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES, 1867-1960 47, n. 51 (1963).
41. See BRAYHAMMOND, SOVEREIGNTYANDANEMPrYPuRE, BAN SAND PoLTcsN
THE CIVIL WAR 25 (1970).
42. See GILCHRT & LEwIS, supra note 32, at 99.
43. See HEPBURN, supra note 5, at 541.
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tem after the Civil War." They served in the place of a central
bank.45 Clearinghouse certificates were used as a means of relieving
temporary stringencies in the money supply.46 The value of the
clearinghouse certificates proved themselves during the panics in
1873,1884,1890 and 1893.4" The federal government was also learn-
ing that its activities could affect money market conditions.48 By
1887, the government was intervening in the money markets to
supply additional cash by buying bonds.4 9 In 1899, the Secretary of
the Treasury began using the national banks as a means to stabilize
the markets during times of uncertainty. The Secretary was seeking
to act as a central banker, but had neither the resources nor the
knowledge needed to implement such policies successfully."
The trust companies became popular at the turn of the cen-
tury as a mechanism for avoiding the functional regulation that was
being imposed on commercial banks." The Knickerbocker Trust
44. The Suffolk Bank of Boston had created a clearing system in 1819 that sought
to prevent state banks from over-issuing their bills. The Suffolk Bank agreed to re-
deem the bills of New England country banks at par, if those banks kept funds on de-
posit with the Suffolk Bank. See ARTHUR NUSSBAUM, A HISTORY OF THE DOLLAR 67
(1957).
45. The original plan for the bank clearing house in New York was published in
the Bankers Magazine in September of 1853. Sixty-two banks participated in its organi-
zation. See KNOx, supra note 22, at 423. Initially, the primary role of the clearing house
was to exchange checks and drafts between the member banks and to settle balances
resulting from those exchanges. See JAMES G. CANNON, CLEARING HOUSES, S. Doc. No.
61-491, at 11 (1910).
46. See S. Doc. No. 61-491, at 75.
47. See HEPBURN, supra note 5, at 349.
48. During the Civil War, the government or its agents periodically engaged in
bond transactions to undermine speculators who were driving up gold prices. For
example, after the assassination of Abraham Lincoln, Jay Cooke, the Union govern-
ment's principal bond salesman, was given carte blanche authority by the Treasury to
support the market for government securities. He bought $20 million of bonds in a
week and stopped a panic. Cooke was also later able to sell the bonds he had bought
for a profit. See MEADE MINNIGERODE, CERTAIN RICH MEN 65 (1927). Even earlier, in
1791, Alexander Hamilton had tried unsuccessfully to support the securities market in
New York during a panic by authorizing the purchase of $150,000 in government secu-
rities. See WARSHOW, supra note 2, at 144-145; JOHN STEELE GORDON, THE GREATGAME,
THE EMERGENCE OF WALL STREET AS A WORLD POWER 1653-2000 44 (1999).
49. Money More Plentiful, N.Y. TIMES, September 22,1887, at 1.
50. See HAROLD VANB. CLEVELAND & THOMASF. HUERTAS, CrrIBANK, 1812-1970 48
(1985).
51. The number of trust companies increased from seven in 1865 to over 250 in
1890. See HERMAN E. KROOSS & MARTIN R. BLYN, A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL INTERMEDIAR-
2000]
230 NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE [Vol. 4
Company was the third largest trust company in New York with
deposits in excess of $60 million when it failed on October 22,
1907.52 The Knickerbocker's failure touched off a panic that was one
of the worst in the history of the United States. 3 The federal gov-
ernment appeared to be helpless in dealing with the crisis. Instead,
a single individual emerged as the country's savior. He was an
unlikely, unappreciated, but well paid, hero. That individual, J.P.
Morgan, acted as a "one-man Federal Reserve Bank" in stopping the
panic. 4 Even so, the country was left shaken and stunned by the
suddenness and force of that economic catastrophe. 5
Congress created a Monetary Commission to examine the
causes of the Panic of 1907 and to propose measures to prevent such
an occurrence in the future. 6 The Commission was chaired by
ms 102 (1971). Some 50 trust companies were chartered in New York alone between
1870 and 1900. See H. PEERS BREWER, THE EMERGENCE OF THE TRUST COMPANY IN NEW
YORK CrrY, 1870-1900 263 (1986).
52. See JAMES G. CANNON, CLEARING HOUSES, S. Doc. No. 61-491, at 251 (1910).
53. See WILLIAM 0. SCROGGS, A CENTURY OF BANKING PROGRESS 258-259 (1924).
54. See PAUL B. TREScoTr, FINANCING AMERICAN ENTERPRISE: THE STORY OF COM-
MERCIAL BANKING 127 (1963).
55. Senator Nelson Aldrich later noted that "the country escaped by the narrow-
est possible margin from a total collapse of all credit and a wholesale destruction of all
values." SENATOR NELSON W. ALDRICH, THE WORK OF THE NATIONAL MONETARY COM-
MISSION, S. Doc. No. 61-406, at 3 (1909). Senator Aldrich stated that:
To the great majority of the people of the country the blow came
without a warning. Most of our banking institutions were in excellent
condition, business of every kind was prosperous, labor was fully
employed at satisfactory wages, industries of every kind were flour-
ishing. Our people were full of hope and confidence for the future.
Suddenly the banks of the country suspended payment, and acknowl-
edged their inability to meet their current obligations on demand.
The results of this suspension were felt at once; it became impossible
in many cases to secure funds or credit to move crops or to carry on
ordinary business operations; a complete disruption of domestic ex-
changes took place; disorganization and financial embarrassment af-
fected seriously every industry; thousands of men were thrown out of
employment, and the wages of the employed were reduced.
Id. at 3-4.
56. Congress initially focused on the "inelastic" money supply as a prime culprit
in the Panic of 1907. That concern led to the enactment of the Aldrich-Vreeland Act of
1908, which established "National Currency Associations" that would provide relief in
times of stringency. The National Currency Associations were to provide emergency
liquidity by allowing banks to issue credit notes against deposits of commercial paper,
as well as government bonds. See CLEVELAND & HUERTAS, supra note 50, at 60; DAVIS
RICH DEWEY, FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 482 (1928); THOMAS W. LAMONT,
HENRY P. DAVISON 95 (1933).
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Senator Aldrich. He conducted an extensive investigation that
lasted almost four years. Senator Aldrich introduced legislation in
1912 that proposed the creation of such a central banking authority
in the United States." Following much debate and various com-
promises, the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 was enacted. 8 It created
a further division in bank regulation. In addition to state regulation,
federal bank regulatory authority was being split between the
Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve System (the "Fed").
The Comptroller of the Currency at the Treasury retained responsi-
bility for examining and regulating the national banks, while the
Fed managed monetary issues.
D. Branch Banking
Another regulatory issue affecting banking was restrictions on
branch banking. Branch banking was an established practice in the
United States almost from the country's inception,59 but branch
banking by national banks was restricted under the National Bank-
ing Act.6" By 1895, branching was permitted in twenty states, but
57. Ostensibly the result of the Monetary Commission's study, the bill had actu-
ally been written in a secret meeting of bankers at a millionaires' club on Jekyll Island
in Georgia where the participants arrived in a private rail car. Disguised as a group of
wealthy duck hunters, they concluded that a federal banking system was needed to
provide liquidity to the private banks in times of stress. The group eschewed a central
bank that would be controlled by the government. Instead, they opted for a more de-
centralized system that would be controlled by private bankers, such as themselves.
See RON CHERNOW, TrrAN, THE LIFE Op JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER, SR. 375 (1998); LAMONT,
supra note 56, at 97-99 (1933); JEAN STROUSE, MORGAN, AMERICAN FINANCIER 626 (1999);
SCROGGS, supra note 53, at 280.
58. See KENDRiCK A. CLEMENTr, WOODROW WnlSON, WORLD STATESMAN, 113
(1987); DEWEY, supra note 56, at 491; KROOSS & BLYN, supra note 51, at 180.
59. Despite concerns expressed by Alexander Hamilton with branch banking, the
first Bank of the United States had opened several branches. The second Bank of the
United States had twenty-five branches in 1830. See KLEBANER, supra note 10, at 13.
Some 100 branches were being operated by banks in 1834; a number that swelled to
about 175 branches in 1861. The State Bank of Ohio had 36 six branches at the out-
break of the Civil War. See id.
60. The second Comptroller of the Currency, Freeman Clarke, had ruled that na-
tional banks could not branch. See Donald C. Langevoort, Interpreting the McFadden
Act: Vie Politics and Economics of shared ATMs and Discount Brokerage Houses, 41 Bus.
LAW. 1265, 1266 (1986). State banks converting to national banks were allowed to
maintain their existing branches but could not expand their number. Although the
Comptroller of the Currency sought legislation at various times in the 1880s and early
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most branch banks were intra-city branches, and eight of those
states later prohibited branching.6' By 1896, thirteen states prohib-
ited branch banking and many other states considered the practice
to be illegal.62 Charles G. Dawes, Comptroller of the Currency, was
among those who had come to oppose branch banking. He and
other opponents were concerned that large banks would become too
powerful. This was a reflection of the concern with the trusts and
other large corporations that were developing at this time. The
thought was that branch banking "would result in building up a
money power which would crush the small banks out of exis-
tence."63 In one statement in Congress, it was claimed that "a choice
must be made between one great United States Bank with ten thou-
sand branches, and on the other hand ten thousand independent
banks."'
Between 1900 and 1902, several branch banking bills were in-
troduced in Congress. That legislation failed as a result of opposi-
tion from the country banks who did not want that competition.
At the end of the nineteenth century, only five national and eighty-
two state banks had branches. In total, they had 119 branches.66
1890s that would have allowed national banks to establish branches in small towns,
Congress refused to pass such an act. See KLEBANER, supra note 10, at 59.
61. See FISCHER, supra note 12, at 33; KLEBANER, supra note 10, at 60.
62. See JOHN A. JAMES, MONEY AND CAPITAL MARKEIS IN POTBELLUM AMERICA 90
(1978).
63. See FLSCHER, supra note 12, at 27.
64. See id. at 26-29. The Jeffersonian and Jacksonian schools of political thought
had spawned the "populist" movement that was heavily agrarian in outlook and
blamed many of mankind's problems on the monied interests. This movement was
reaching its peak at the turn of the century as the muckrakers were discovering that
John D. Rockfeller and the other trusts were controlling vast amalgamations of wealth.
Congressman Charles Lindbergh of Minnesota, the father of the famous flyer, con-
vinced Congress in 1911 to investigate the financial markets. See A. SCoTrBERG, LIND-
BERGH 34-36 (1998). Lindbergh, who was given credit for creating the "money trust
hunt" by Ida Tarbell, claimed that a "money trust" was controlling American finance
"in restraint of trade." See JAMES GRANT, MONEY OFTHE MIND, BORROWING AND LEND.
ING IN AMElicA FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO MICHAEL MILIEN 124 (1992); CLEVELAND &
HUERTAS, supra note 50, at 67. The resulting investigation targeted J.P. Morgan. The
House Committee on Banking and Currency uncovered some startling evidence as to
just how much control Morgan exercised over Wall Street. See id. See also MARGARET
G. MYERS, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 253-254 (1970).
65. See Eugene Nelson White, State-Sponsored Insurance of Bank Deposits in the
United States, 1907-1929, xli J. ECONOMIC ISTORY 537,541 (Sept. 1981).
66. See First Nat'l Bank of Logan v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 385 U.S. 252, 257
(1966).
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Opposition to branch banking was at first scattered but was grow-
ing after the twentieth century began. The American Bankers Asso-
ciation was a firm opponent of branch banking. It adopted a
resolution in 1916 against branches, and a similar resolution was
passed in 1922.67 The Comptroller of the Currency was seeking leg-
islation to limit branch banking because of his concern that unlim-
ited branch banking would mean the destruction of the national
banking system.6 8 Despite that opposition, by 1920, the number of
branch banks had increased substantially. Branch banks then held
some fifteen percent of loans and investments of commercial
banks. 9 In 1923, there were 91 national and 580 state banks that had
a total of over 2,000 branches. 0 Branches outside of home office ar-
eas began to increase further in 1925.71 Even then, the trend was to
prohibit or tightly restrict branch banking. This resulted in "unit"
banking in the United States, i.e., single bank units.12 These indi-
vidual banks established correspondent banking arrangements with
other banks in order to conduct interstate or even inter-city banking
transactions. 3 The correspondents borrowed from each other and
referred business outside their geographical area. " Most country
banks were strongly dependent on their correspondent banking re-
lationships in New York, which was the nation's money center by
the time of the Civil War.7' Nevertheless, correspondent banking
frustrated efforts by the city banks and their clearinghouses to stabi-
lize liquidity during times of panic because the country banks
67. See FISCHER, supra note 12, at 43, 45.
68. See First Nat'l Bank of St. Louis v. Missouri, 263 U.S. 640 (1924).
69. See FISCHER, supra note 12, at 34. California was the most liberal in allowing
branch banking. Some 80 banks in that state had over 475 branches. The branch bank
leader was Amadeo Giannini, who had a chain of 24 banks in California by 1918. See
ALEX GRONER, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE HISTORY O AmERICANBUSINESS & INDUSTRY 284
(1972).
70. See First Nat'l Bank of Logan, 385 U.S. at 257.
71. See FIScHER, supra note 12, at 38. Groups of "chain" banks were operating in
the United States, i.e., banks that were jointly owned. They were limited in their op-
erations until state statutes were amended to allow holding companies. See id. at 75-76.
72. See JAMES, supra note 62, at 90.
73. See id. at 121.
74. See KLEBANER, supra note 10, at 71.
75. See JAMES, supra note 62, at 95-96.
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would withdraw their deposits in times of trouble.7 6
The McFadden Act that was adopted in 1926 sought to allow
national banks to establish branches under conditions similar to
those permitted by state banks." The McFadden Act provided for
the creation of new branches by national banks in states that permit-
ted banks to have branches and in cities with a population of more
than 25,000.78 Actually, "[t]he ultimate effect of the McFadden Act
was to allow state legislators and regulators to prevent out-of-state
banks from opening branches within their borders."79 This assured
that small communities would only be served by their local banks.
They would be spared the competition and services of the larger
and better capitalized big city banks. More significantly, restrictions
on branch banking resulted in a large number of very weak banks
that would be unable to cope with a serious economic downturn.80
E. Monetary Policy
The Fed found itself struggling with monetary policy almost
from its inception. The country experienced an expansion after
World War I that the Fed tried to slow.8' At the same time, farm
commodity prices were falling, and a "commodity or inventory
panic" resulted in a recession in the farm belt.82 The economy re-
covered by 1923, and it was thought that the Fed had stabilized the
76. See Eugene Nelson White, State-Sponsored Insurance of Bank Deposits in tile
United States, 1907-1929, xli J. EcONOMIC HISTORY 537, 540 (Sept. 1981).
77. See SCROGGS, supra note 53, at 319. Before the enactment of McFadden Act,
the national banks were still limited to one bank office, but they could have branches
in the city in which they were located. See RONALD P. AuERBAcH, HISTORICAL OVER-
VIEW OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 20 (1979). Such branches could
only accept deposits and pay out funds. See SCROGGS, supra note 53, at 317.
78. See Financial Institutions and the Nation's Economy (FINE), Discussion of Princi-
ples, Committee on Banking, Currency and Housing, H.R. Rep. 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (com-
mittee print) 146 June 1976); KROoSs & BLYN, supra note 51, at 160 (1971).
79. See Laura Turner Beyer, North Carolina Banking in 1997: The Year in Review,
2 N. C. BANKING INST. i, xiv-xv (1998).
80. See DAVID M. KENNEDY, FREEDOM FROM FEAR, THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IN DE-
PRESSION AND WAR, 1929-1945 66 (1999).
81. See CLEVELAND & HUERTAS, supra note 50, at 104-105.
82. See United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621, 641 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
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situation and prevented a panic in the financial markets.8 3 This "led
many to believe that this nation... [had] undergone its last money
panic" and that the Fed could safely guide the economy during
troubled times.84 Critics claimed that the Fed actually did little to
alleviate the recession in the farm belt."
Another problem was a power struggle in the Federal Re-
serve System. 6 This internecine fight was the result of efforts by the
New York Federal Reserve Bank to gain prominence over the other
Reserve Banks in the system. The other Reserve Banks were resist-
ing New York's dominance over monetary policy and were some-
times pursuing their own open market policies.87 This fight for
control would have grave consequences in the events that led to the
stock market crash of 1929. The Fed sought to curb stock market
speculation beginning in 1928, but was frustrated by disputes with
the New York Federal Reserve Bank where Charlie Mitchell, the
President of the National City Bank (later Citibank), was appointed
as a director in 1929.88 After the Fed sought to restrict credit in
1929, Mitchell announced that the National City Bank would loan
$25 million into the call money market to provide liquidity.89 Its af-
83. See SCROGGS, supra note 53, at 309-310.
84. Id. at 310.
85. See 1 Jane W. D'ARISTA, THE EVOLUTON OF U.S. FINANCE, FEDERAL RESERVE
MONETARY PoucY: 1915-1935 7-8 (1994) [hereinafter D'Arista 1]. For a discussion of
the Federal Reserve structure and monetary policy from 1915 to 1935 see, H.R. Doc.
No. 92-1, at 1-2. (1971) (Federal Reserve Structure and the Development of Monetary
Policy: 1915-1935, Committee Print, Staff Report of the Subcomm. on Domestic Fin.,
Comm. on Banking, Finanace and Urban Affairs).
86. See H.R. Dc. No. 92-1, at 1-2.
87. See D'ARISTA 1, supra note 85, at 4.
88. New York's position in this debate was due not only to role as the leading
city of finance, but also to the fact that Governor Benjamin Strong of the New York
Federal Reserve Bank had been both domineering and persuasive. Strong died in
1928, and this led to a diminishment of the New York Federal Reserve Bank's authority
on the Open Market Investment Committee. His death, however, came too late to af-
fect the policies that would then seeking to deal with the frenzied speculation occur-
ring in the stock market. See H.R. Doc. No. 92-1, at 1-2.
89. See JOHN KENNETH GALBRArrH, THE GREAT CRAsH 1929 38 (1988). Mitchell
stated that his bank would make those loans, "whatever might be the attitude of the
Federal Reserve Board." Mitchell asserted that the National City Bank would make
$5 million available when call rates went to 16% percent and would add another $5
million each time the rate rose one point. At that time, the First National Bank was
borrowing money from the Fed and using that money to make call loans. See GRANT,
supra note 64, at 193.
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filiate, the National City Company was the nation's largest distribu-
tor of securities at that time." Senator Carter Glass of Virginia was
incensed by Mitchell's announcement. The Senator demanded
Mitchell's resignation as the director of the New York Federal Re-
serve Bank.9" This and other disputes with the New York Federal
Reserve Bank "largely paralyzed monetary policy during almost the
whole of the important year 1929."92
F. The New Deal
Bank failures reached epidemic proportions after the stock
market crash of 1929. In December of 1930, the Bank of United
States failed. It was the largest bank failure in history at that time,
but there were many joining it.93 By 1932, one in four banks in the
United States had failed.94 Franklin Roosevelt was sworn in as
President during the bank panic that struck America.95 He declared
a national bank holiday on March 6,1933, and new legislation was
enacted to strengthen the banking system. 6 Federal insurance was
created to protect customer bank deposits and to maintain faith in
the banks in order to prevent depositor runs. This insurance was to
be administered by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
("FDIC").97
The Glass-Steagall Act sought the "complete divorcement" of
commercial and investment banking.98 There is still uncertainty as
90. See CLEVELAND & HUERTAS, supra note 50, at 107, 132.
91. See ROBERTSOBEL, THE BIG BOARD, A HISTORY OFTHE NEW YORK STOCK MARKET
268-269 (1965).
92. FRIEDMAN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 40, at 255.
93. See id. at 309-310.
94. The Bubble Burst, LIFE, Spring 1992, at 26 (collector's edition).
95. See MICHEL BEAUD, A HISTORY OF CAPITAuSM, 1500-1980 159 (1983).
96. See Auerbach, supra note 77, at 17.
97. See Banking Act of 1933,48 Stat. 162,168-169 (1933) (codified as amended at
12 U.S.C. § 1811 (1994)). See MYERS, supra note 64, at319; PETERFEARON, WAR, PROSPER-
ITY AND DEPRESSION: THE U.S. ECONOMY 1917-45 220 (1987). The Banking Act of 1935
replaced the Federal Reserve Board with the Board of Governors of the Federal Re-
serve System. See AUERBACH, supra note 77, at 19. The Banking Act of 1935 sought to
strengthen the Federal Reserve Board's authority over national and large state banks.
See CLEVELAND & HUERTAS, supra note 50, at 194-195.
98. S. REP. No. 73-1455,at 185 (2d Sess. 1934). Commercial banks were prohibited
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to why Congress mandated such an approach. Presumably, it was
due to the failure of the Bank of United States and its securities af-
filiate -- the City Financial Corporation. The affiliate, however, was
not shown to have caused the banks failure.99 The real reason for
this legislation may have been Congressional annoyance with
Charles Mitchell and the National City Co., the securities affiliate of
the National City Bank.00 Mitchell's defiance of the Federal Reserve
Board's efforts to curb call money before the crash was certainly in-
tended to benefit his bank's security affiliate, the National City Co.
It also angered Senator Glass.1'
G. The Market Knocks on the Regulatory Door
The Fed only slowly grasped the reigns of control over mone-
tary policy. That agency was accused of pushing the country back
from engaging in the "issue, flotation, underwriting, public sale or distribution either
wholesale, or retail or through a syndicate participation, of stocks, bonds, debentures,
notes or other securities." See TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, INC., THE SECURITYMARKETS
84 (1935).
99. See GRANT supra note 64, at 203-210. A Fed official testified during the Glass-
Steagall hearings that, while there had been abuses with the bank affiliates, the Board
did not advocate prohibiting banks from having securities affiliates. See David Saul
Roberts, Regulating the Securities Industry: The Evolution of a Government Policy 73
(1969) (on file with author).
100. After the Comptroller of the Currency ruled in 1902 that a national bank
could not act as an investment bank in underwriting securities, the larger national
banks began forming affiliates to act as securities dealers. The National City Company
was formed by the National City Bank. See S. Rep. No. 73-1455, at 157 (1934). On No-
vember 6,1911, Frederick W. Lehman, the Solicitor General of the United States, ren-
dered an opinion to the Attorney General in which the Solicitor opined that the
creation of the National City Co. violated banking laws. See GEORGE W EDWARDS, THE
EVOLUTION OF FINANCE CAPITALISM 193 (1967). The National City Bank ignored that
ruling. The Attorney General then adopted the Solicitor's opinion and was prepared to
mount a formal challenge to the subsidiary as being in violation of the national bank-
ing laws. The Secretary of the Treasury, however, took the opposite position. See
CLEVELAND & HUERTAS, supra note 50, at 62-66. President William H. Taft then decided
to let the issue die. See id. at 66-67.
101. Senator Glass stated that the Federal Reserve System had been transformed
into an "investment banking system" while the purpose of the Fed was to create a
commercial banking system free of speculation. Glass was concerned that a member
bank could engage in speculative operations and then, when its reserves were im-
paired, take eligible paper for rediscount and use the additional funds for more specu-
lation in a "roundabout way." See R. Nicholas Rodelli, Note, The New Operating
Standards for Section 20 Subsidiaries: The Federal Reserve Board's Prudent March Toward
Financial Services Modernization, 2 N.C. BANKING INST. 311, 313 n. 17 (1998).
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into recession in 1937 by its restrictive policies. °2 The Fed was also
forced to bow to the Treasury Department on issues of monetary
policy during World War II. In order to reduce government costs
caused by that conflict, the Treasury Department decreed that inter-
est rates would be kept at artificially low levels.'0 3 The Fed agreed
to that policy until post-war inflation became more of a threat than
high government borrowing costs.0 4 Friction between the Fed and
the Treasury on this issue increased until the adoption of the so-
called "Treasury-Federal Reserve Accord" that was entered into by
the Fed and the Treasury in March of 1951. The agreement
strengthened the role of the Fed in managing federal monetary pol-
icy.10 5
The Fed's Regulation Q restricted interest rates paid on time
deposits by national banks.'0 6 Because of Regulation Q, banking
was not viewed to be a very complicated business in the 1950s. It
was claimed that bankers operated on a "3-6-3" rule. This meant
that the bankers borrowed money at the Regulation Q interest rate
of three percent and loaned the money at six percent. The bankers
were then free to play golf by three o'clock, since there was nothing
else to do. 7 Advertising premiums were offered in the 1950s for
new business. This allowed banks to avoid Regulation Q ceilings.
Toasters and other giveaways were used to attract depositors to
these programs.' 8
The 1960s marked the beginning of an era in which financial
service firms sought to expand and diversify their businesses across
regulatory boundaries. James J. Saxon, who was appointed by
102. See WILLIAM GREIDER, SECRETS OF THE TEMPLE 320-321 (1987).
103. See FRIEDMAN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 40, at 625-626.
104. See generally What's News, WALL ST. J., Sep. 2,1950, at 1.
105. "The Treasury-Federal Reserve Accord of March 4,1951, stands as a land-
mark in American monetary history, because it marks the end of inflexible pegging of
the prices of treasury obligations." LESTER V. CHANDLER & STEPHEN M. GOLDFELD, THE
ECONOMICs OF MONEY AND BANKING 564 (1977). It was "one of the most dramatic
events in the history of American economic policy." Herbert Stein, The Model of a Mod-
em Central Banker, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7,1998, at A10.
106. See WilSON, supra note 38, at 81.
107. See PHILLIPL. ZWEIG, WRIsrON: WALTER WRIsrON, CrnIBANK, ANDTHE RISE AND
FALL OF AMERICAN FINANCIAL SUPREMACY 46 (1995).
108. See HERBERT V. PROCHNOW & HERBERT V. PROCHNOW, JR., THE CHANGING
WORLD OF BANKING 60 (1974).
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President Kennedy to the position of Comptroller of the Currency,
sought to open the door to such diversification to the banks."9
Saxon and his successors took an expansive view of the banking
laws in allowing the banks to broaden their business base." '
Saxon's rulings upset a delicate balance between the banking and
other financial service industries. He started an effort that continues
today to remove restrictions on banks that prevent them from ag-
gressively expanding their business activities. The rulings of the
Comptroller were challenged in court by competitors and were
sometimes stricken down, but the effort to ease restrictions on bank
activities continued."'
The banks began looking for other loopholes to expand their
business and avoid banking regulations. The Bank Holding Com-
pany Act of 1956 restricted the ability of bank holding companies to
enter into other lines of business or to purchase other banks.I2 Such
activities required Fed approval, but the Bank Holding Company
Act of 1956 did not apply to one-bank holding companies."13 The
number of one-bank holding companies grew rapidly as this loop-
hole was exploited. These entities held about one third of total bank
109. See RALPH NADER, STUDY GROUP REPORT ON FIRST NATIONAL CITIBANK, Cm-
BANK 273-274 (1972).
110. See id. at 280.
111. See 2 Jane W. D'ARPSTA, THE EVOLUTON OF U.S. FINANCE, RES RUCTURING IN-
sTITUTIONSAND MARKETS, at 69 (1994) [hereinafter D'Arista 21. Among other things, the
Comptroller ruled that national banks could make data processing services available to
other banks and to bank customers and that such activities were incidental to their
banking services. That decision was appealed to the Supreme Court. See Association
of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970). The Comp-
troller announced in 1962 that national banks would be permitted to act as agents for
insurance sales, but that action was overturned by the federal appeals court for the
Fifth Circuit. See Saxon v. Georgia Ass'n of Indep. Ins. Agents, 399 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir.
1968). The Comptroller ruled in 1963 that a national bank could accept savings ac-
counts from a corporation. The Federal Reserve Board, however, then asserted that
such deposit had to be treated as a "time deposit." Otherwise, it would be a demand
deposit on which the payment of interest would be prohibited. This resulted in a
highly publicized dispute between the two agencies. See Howard H. Hackley, Our
Baffling Banking System, 52 VA. L. REv. 565, 618-620 (1966). In another ruling, the
Comptroller concluded that providing travel services to customers was incidental to
the business of banking and was a permissible activity for national banks. That action
was overturned by the Supreme Court. See Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 400 U.S. 45
(1970).
112. See AUERBAcH, supra note 77, at 31.
113. See supra note 111, at 69.
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deposits" 4 This concerned Congress, and it acted to close the one
bank holding company exception through the Bank Holding Com-
pany Act Amendments of 1970.15
H. Competition Bites
As inflation increased, the Fed's interest rate ceilings began to
interfere with the ability of the banks to attract deposits." 6 Credit
"crunches" were occurring in which loan demand was out stripping
the amount of funds banks had available to lend. The banks were
seemingly helpless in dealing with these crunches. They could not
attract sufficient deposits to meet loan demand at Regulation Q
rates. This gave rise to a growing concern with "disintermediation"
in which funds were being drawn from deposit institutions such as
banks and savings and loan associations ("S&Ls") and invested in
other investments such as securities."17 One source of competition
114. See id. Chase Manhattan Bank was among those forming a one-bank holding
company. See WILSON, supra note 38, at 187. The First National City Bank also formed
a one-bank holding company called CitiCorp. Numerous conglomerates were acquir-
ing or creating one-bank holding companies, including Montgomery Ward, Baldwin
Piano and even S&H Green Stamps. Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corporation
even tried to acquire the Chemical Bank in New York through a one-bank holding
company arrangement. See D'ARISTA 2, supra note 111, at 69- 70.
115. See CHISTOPHER ELIAS, THE DOLLAR BARONS 162 (1973).
116. Citibank ran into trouble with the Fed in 1980 when it gave away toasters
and appliances in order to attract deposits at Regulation Q rates. The Fed had limited
such gifts to amounts of between ten and fifty dollars based on the amount of the de-
posit. Citibank's "gifts" were exceeded those limitations, and it was fined $350,000 as
punishment for this heinous crime. See ZwEIG, supra note 107, at 673-674.
117. See MYERs, supra note 64, at 390-391. President Nixon created a Commission
on Financial Structure & Regulation in 1970 that was chaired by Reed 0. Hunt. The
Hunt Commission recommended that limits on interest rates on deposits be abolished
for accounts of more than $100,000 and that such rates should be used only on a
standby basis for smaller accounts. See The Report of the President's Commission on
Financial Structure & Regulation (Dec. 1971). The House Committee on Banking, Cur-
rency and Housing began a study in 1975 entitled "Financial Institutions and the Na-
tion's Economy." ("FINE"). It sought to provide a basis for restructuring the regulation
of banking and other deposit institutions. The FINE study asserted that "[a]rtificial
ceilings on interest rates paid to depositors reduce the incentive for Americans to save,
discriminate against small savers, and have not succeeded in preventing disinterme-
diation." The FINE study proposed that a Federal Depository Institutions Commission
be created and that all Regulation Q limits on interest rates be eliminated, along with
the prohibition against paying interest on demand deposits. See H.R. REP. No. 94-242
(1975); H.R. REP. No. 94-241 (1975) (Discussion of principles).
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for funds was the money market funds.' 8 In June of 1976, money
market funds held less than $3 billion. "9 By December of 1982, over
$230 billion was held in money market funds at broker-dealers.12 °
Those money market funds became substitutes for bank accounts
and allowed consumers to earn market rates on their liquid funds.121
The banks turned to NOW accounts, negotiable CDs, Euro-
dollars, Eurobonds and other sources for funds.' They also looked
118. Henry B.R. Brown and Bruce R. Bent invented the money market fund in
1971 in order to avoid the restrictions in Regulation Q that limited interest rates on
bank deposits. See ZWEIG, supra note 107, at 363-364; DIANA B. HENRIQUES, FIDELITY'S
WORLD 196 (1995). Actually, money market funds were not all that new. A New York
Stock Exchange member firm, Henry Clews & Co., published advertisements in the
New York Times in 1896 announcing "[i]nterest allowed on deposit accounts." This
seems to be a form of cash management account such as those made popular by
Merrill Lynch in the 1980s. See N.Y. TviES, Nov. 5,1896, at 10. In 1889, Howard Lap-
sley & Co. bought and sold stocks and bonds for cash "or on margin at the New York
Stock Exchange." In addition, the firm stated in its advertisements that "Interest al-
lowed on Deposits subject to Check at sight." WALL ST. J., July 16,1889, at 2.
119. See LEO M. LOLL & JULIAN G. BUcKLE, THE OvR-THE-CouNTm SECURITIES
MARKETS 87 (4th ed. 1981).
120. See ZWEIG, supra note 107, at 774.
121. The Merrill Lynch Cash Management Account ("CMA") that was introduced
in 1977 linked a Merrill Lynch money market fund with check-writing privileges. See
MERRILL LYNCH, ANNUAL REPORT 1985 14 (1986). See generally, Peter Truell, The New
Boss at Merrill Lynch, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20,1996, at D1. For a discussion and description
of how the Merrill Lynch Cash Management Account worked in connection with a
bank account at Bank One that was used for processing check and debit card transac-
tions, see MARTIN MAYER, THE BANKERS, THE NEXT GENERATION 90-92 (1997).
122. Turmoil in international finance and restrictions on United States banks re-
sulted in the development of the "Eurodollar," i.e., time deposits of American dollars
outside the United States whose maturity may vary from overnight to more than a
year. See RALPHNADER'SSTUDYGROUPREPORTONFIRSTNATIONALCITIBANK, CITIBANK
307 (1972); GORDON L. WIEL & IAN DAVIDSON, THE GOLD WAR 44 (1970); Wilson, supra
note 38, at 121. Eurodollars were particularly popular because there were no interest
rate ceilings on such deposits. See id. at 122. See also, PROCHNOW & PROCHNOW, supra
note 108, at 100. New instruments were developed to take advantage of those depos-
its. One such device was the Eurodollar bond. See INSTrrUTIONAL INVESTOR, THE WAY
IT WAS: AN ORALHISTORY OFF INANCE: 1967-1987 326,569 (1988); HALS. ScoTr & PHILIP
A. WELLONS, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE, TRANSACTIONS, POLICY AND REGULATIONS 487,
654 (1995).
The Consumer Savings Bank in Worcester, Massachusetts created the negotia-
ble order of withdrawal ("NOW") account in 1972 as a means to compete with money
market accounts. See ZWEIG, supra note 107, at 365. A NOW account was essentially a
checking account that paid interest, but the depository institution had the right to re-
quire prior notice of withdrawal since the withdrawal was technically coming from a
savings account rather than a demand deposit account. See Board of Governors of the
Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 361 (1986). NOW accounts also
circumvented regulations preventing savings banks and S&Ls from offering demand
2000]
NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE
elsewhere for profits. Foreign exchange operations grew, although
not always without loss, as demonstrated by the failure of the
Franklin National Bank and the Bankhaus Herstatt 23 The latter's
failure nearly caused a breakdown in the American CHIPS payment
system. 24 Competition was causing the banks to make questionable
loans. In 1975, non-performing loans at Chase Manhattan Bank
were over $1.8 billion. 25 That amount increased by another $400
million in 1976. Earlier, in 1974, the Secretary of the Treasury,
George Schultz, announced that controls established ten years be-
fore on credit extensions by banks outside of the United States were
being abolished. 26 Thereafter, international lending grew faster
than domestic lending for many banks.127 This business included
large Latin American investments that would cause enormous
losses. Years later, the largest banks in the United States were set-
ting aside billions of dollars as loss reserves for loans to Latin Amer-
ica. 12 8
Deposits were becoming a smaller factor in banking. As
banking expanded, and regulatory limits on interest payments
squeezed out deposits, "borrowed money, rather than demand de-
posits were used to provide the fuel for bank growth." 29 Restric-
deposit accounts.
123. The Franklin's Bank's failure was, at that time, the largest bank failure in
American history. See SAMPSON, supra note 32, at 132-135.
124. Herstatt suffered losses of some $200 million from foreign exchange specula-
tions before it collapsed. See KARL ERIcH BORN, INTERNATIONAL BANKING IN THE 19TH
AND 20TH CENTURIES 24,27 (1983); ZWEIG, supra note 107, at 455.
125. See WILSON, supra note 38, at 240.
126. See ZWEIG, supra note 107, at 388.
127. See WILSON, supra note 38, at 284.
128. In August of 1982, Mexico announced that it could not meet its debt obliga-
tions, which totaled $85 billion. Mexico then nationalized its banks and declared a
moratorium on the principal payments of its debt. See generally INSTITUTIONAL INVES-
TOR, THE WAYIT WAS, AN ORALHISTORY OFFINANCE, 1967-1987445,448 (1988); BARRIE
A. WIGMORE, SECURTmES MARKETS IN THE 1980s: THE NEW REGIME, 1979-1984 40-41
(1997). At that time, the nine largest American banks had Mexican loans that totaled
44% of their capital. See GREIDER, supra note 102, at 484. The United States put to-
gether a rescue package. See MARTN H. WOLFSON, FINANCIAL CRISES 90 (1994); ZWEIG,
supra note 107, at 758. This did not stop the crisis. Mexico's problems were followed
by defaults in Brazil, Argentina and more than 20 other countries. The 10 largest
United States banks had $50 billion in loans to countries that were about to default at
the end of 1982. See BARRIE A. WIGMORE, SECURITIES MARKETS IN THE 1980s: THE NEW
REGIME, 1979-1984 41 (1997).
129. See WILSON, supra note 38, at 2.
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tions on the ability of banks to expand their business base and
Regulation Q restrictions on their ability to compete for funds was
crippling the banking sector.3 ' American banks had dominated
world finance beginning as early as World War I. By the middle of
the 1970s, only four of the top twenty banks in the world were
American.3 3 That number was reduced to three in 1979.132
Large bank failures were occurring. To name a few, the Na-
tional Bank of San Diego failed in December of 1973. It had almost
$1 billion in deposits. 33 The Bank of the Commonwealth in Detroit
had to be rescued by the FDIC.134 The First Pennsylvania Bank, the
oldest bank in the United States, was failing in April of 1980. The
bank had used short term money to finance long term bonds. In or-
der to rescue the First Pennsylvania Bank, a group of banks agreed
to loan it $500 million and to extend a credit line of another $1 bil-
lion. 35 Penn Square, which was operating out of a shopping center,
failed in July of 1982.136 Continental Illinois Bank in Chicago held
130. Competition was coming from other directions. Commercial firms and stock
brokers began acquiring banks and turning them into non-bank banks that either ac-
cepted deposits or made commercial loans, but not both. These non-bank banks were
not subject to banking restrictions. Gulf & Western acquired a California bank and
sold its commercial loan portfolio so that it could become a non-bank bank and not be
subject to the Bank Holding Company Act. J.C. Penney in 1983 did essentially the
same thing when it bought a national bank and sold its commercial loans. Some of the
brokerage firms operating non-bank banks were Merrill Lynch, E.F. Hutton, Paine
Webber, Drexel Burnham, Lambert and Shearson Lehman/American Express. See
D'ARISTA 2, supra note 111, at 88; ZwEIG, supra note 107, at 811. Under the definition of
what constitutes a bank in the Bank Holding Company Act, a bank was an institution
that was both accepting demand deposits and making commercial loans. The Fed
tried to treat the non-banks as banks, but the Supreme Court rejected that effort in
1986. See Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474
U.S. 361 (1986). Congress then intervened by adopting the Competitive Equality in
Banking Act of 1987 that curbed the use of non-bank banks, by redefining "bank" in
the Bank Holding Company Act. See D' ARISTA 2, supra note 111, at 88, 308,369. Non-
bank banks acquired before March 5,1987 were grandfathered. See MICHAEL G. CA-
PATIDES, A GUIDE TO THE CAPITAL MARKETS AcIvrrIEs OF BANKS AND BANK HOLDING
COMPANIES 9, n.12 (1993).
131. See ZWEIG, supra note 107, at 446.
132. See GREIDER, supra note 102, at 26-27.
133. See H.R. Rep. No. 94-241, at160 (1975); WOLFSON, supra note 128, at56 (1994).
134. See IRVINE H. SPRAGUE, BAILOUT, AN INSIDER'S ACCOUNT OF BANK FAILURES
AND RESCUES 53-54 (1986).
135. See INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, supra note 122, at 352 (1988); See ZWEIG, supra
note 107, at 696-697.
136. See GREIDER, supra note 102, at 496. One of the loan officers at Penn Square
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some $1 billion of oil and gas loans that had been originated by
Penn Square.' 37 Continental encountered other problems and had to
be nationalized by the federal government, 3 1 which supplied sev-
eral billion dollars to prop up the bank.' 39
In 1980, BankAmerica Corp was the largest, most profitable
bank in the world. Six years later, it posted a loss of more than $1
billion.'40 Between 1980 and 1985, the Bank of America had to write
off over $4 billion in bad loans14" ' and an additional $7 billion in
Latin American loans was in doubt.'42 Over forty banks failed each
year during the middle of the 1980s. 43 The number of "problem"
depository institutions on the FDIC watch list rose substantially. In
1984, the FDIC had a list of over 500 problem banks.'" That number
soon increased to 800.' 45 By 1986, over 1,000 institutions were on the
FDIC watch list.146
L The Thrifts
The thrifts were another group in the banking sector that were
being hurt by artificial regulatory restraints on their business and
disintermediation. Congress lifted the interest rate ceilings on the
amount of interest these institutions could pay for deposits as inter-
est rates rose. When the interest rate ceilings were raised, the thrifts
were left with a problem. The loans on their books were paying in-
terest rates lower than what they had to pay for deposits at market
was "a flamboyant figure who liked to drink liquor out of his cowboy boots and wear
Mickey Mouse beanies to work." JONATHAN R. MACEY & GEOFFREY P. MILLER, BANKING
LAW AND REGuLAnON 276 (2nd ed. 1997). See also PHILLP L. ZWEIG, BELLY UP, THE COL-
LAPSE OF THE PENN SQUARE BANK (1985).
137. See GARY HECrOR, BREAKING THE BANK, THE DECLINE OF BANKAMERICA 163
(1988); WOLFSON, supra note 128, at 87.
138. See RON CHERNOW, THE HOUSE OF MORGAN 660 (1990).
139. See D'ARISTA2, supra note 111, at389.
140. See HECTOR, supra note 137, at 1.
141. See GREIDER, supra note 102, at 632.
142. See HECOR, supra note 137, at 163. BankAmerica was not the only bank in
trouble from Latin American debt. Citicorp had non-performing foreign loans in 1983
in excess of $1.7 billion. See ZWEIG, supra note 107, at 790.
143. See FEARON, supra note 97, at 221.
144. See id.
145. See D'ARISTA 2, supra note 111, at 365.
146. See id.
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rates.'47 In 1981, after enactment of the Depository Institutions De-
regulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980,48 the thrifts were
paying an average of eleven percent for their funds, while their
mortgage portfolios were yielding only ten percent. 49 The thrifts
lost a total of $8.9 billion in 1981 and 1982.5 o Eighty-one thrifts
failed in 1981 and over 250 failed in the following year."' By 1984,
over thirty percent of all FSLIC insured institutions were operating
at a loss. 15
2
Congress and the states tried to assist the thrifts by lifting re-
strictions on their investments. 53 This laid the groundwork for ar-
guably the worst financial disaster in history. The S&Ls in
particular went on a binge in investing in shopping centers, malls,
147. Depositors withdrew their money in order to obtain higher rates from other
investments. The thrifts could not raise their rates because of interest rate ceilings.
Regulators provided some relief to the thrifts in 1978 by allowing them to sell money
market certificates. Nevertheless, short term rates continued to rise, while income
from fixed rate mortgages issued at lower rates was inadequate to cover costs. The
mismatch between long term loans and short term liabilities resulted in the thrifts pay-
ing more to attract funds than they were earning on their mortgage portfolios. See
WOLFSON, supra note 128, at 66, 80-81; H.R. REP. No. 101-54, at 1 (1989).
148. The Depository Institution Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980
authorized depository institutions, including thrifts and credit unions, to offer interest
bearing NOW accounts. This legislation sought to phase out interest rate caps on bank
and thrift deposits. See D'ARISTA2, supra note 111, at87; H.R. Rep. No. 101-54 (M), 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1989). The phase out of interest rate ceilings on time and savings
deposits that began in 1980 was not completed until 1987. See FEDERAL RESERVE BANK
OF NEW YORK, UNDERSTANDING THE M's IN MONETARY Poucy 9 (1994).
149. See H.R. REP. No. 101-54, at pt. 1 (1989). The freeing of interest rates paid on
deposits allowed the thrifts to compete for investor funds by paying higher interest
rates. Deposit brokers assisted the thrifts in that effort. Large sums obtained from
institutional investors by the deposit brokers were broken up into tranches of $100,000
in order for their deposits to be fully insured. See ROBERT EMMET LONG, BANKING
SCANDALS: THE S&Ls AND BCCI 13 (1993). The 1980 Act had increased the amount of
insurance from $40,000 to $100,000 per account.
150. See H.R. REP. No. 101-54, pt. 1 (1989).
151. See id. The Federal Home Loan Bank Board began encouraging mergers
with S&Ls that were running into financial difficulty. Over 700 such mergers occurred
between 1981 and 1982. See WOLFSON, supra note 128, 81.
152. See D'ARisTA 2, supra note 111, at 366. The situation was exacerbated by the
fact that a change in accounting standards allowed the S&Ls to adopt accounting
methods that masked the magnitude of the problems that the industry was suffering.
See H.R. REP. No. 101-54, pt. I, at 303 (1989).
153. The Depository Institutions Act of 1982 (the "Garn-St Germain" act) allowed
S&Ls to invest up to 40% of their loans in non-residential real estate, 30% in consumer
loans and up to 30% of their assets in equity investments. See LONG, supra note 149, at
15; H.R. REP. No. 101-54, at 297; WOLFSON, supra note 128, at 100.
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buildings and other projects, particularly in the southwest, after in-
vestment restrictions were eased."' The "go-go" thrifts of this era
invested in a number of speculative enterprises that included oil
and drill operations and such things as windmill farms. ' S&Ls be-
came a favorite dumping ground for junk bonds, many of which
were purchased from Drexel Burnham Lambert and Michael
Milken. The S&Ls owned about seven percent of outstanding junk
bonds at one point. Those holdings were concentrated into a few
large S&Ls.'56 Total thrift liabilities grew from $674 billion to $1.1
trillion dollars.'57
The financial difficulties of the S&Ls raised concerns that the
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation ("FSLIC") would
not have sufficient funds to pay insured deposits. In March of 1982,
Congress passed a joint resolution supporting FSLIC. The resolu-
tion stated that the full faith and credit of the United States would
stand behind FSLIC and the FDIC.'58 This set the federal govern-
ment up for a financial disaster of unbelievable dimensions. When
real estate values collapsed at the end of the 1980s, all of the prob-
lems that had been building in the S&Ls were exposed and hun-
dreds of S&Ls failed. A majority of the distressed thrift associations
were in California and Texas.Y5 9 In 1987, the S&L industry lost some
$7 billion.6 In 1988, over 700 banks and over 1,000 S&Ls were be-
ing closed down. 6' Costs to taxpayers from the failed S&Ls were
predicted to range from $500 billion 6 2 to $1 trillion.'63 One congres-
sional subcommittee called the S&L crisis "the greatest financial fi-
asco the United States has ever seen." 'I Regulators estimated that
forty percent of the thrift failures were due to fraud or insider
154. See LoNG, supra note 149, at 36.
155. See WOLFSON, supra note 128, at 101.
156. See JONATHAN B. BASKIN & PAULJ. MIRANTI, JR., A HISTORY OF CORPORATE Fi-
NANCE 295 (1997).
157. See H.R. REP. No. 101-54, at 299.
158. See WOLFSON, supra note 128, at 81.
159. See H.R. REP. No. 101-54, at 303.
160. See HECroR, supra note 137, at 347.
161. See HERBERT S. PARMET, GEORGE BUSH 394-395 (1997).
162. See D'ARsTA 2, supra note 111, at 413.
163. See LONG, supra note 149, at 7.
164. H.R. REP. No. 101-362, at 2 (2d Sess. 1990).
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abuse. 6 ' By 1992, some 1,000 individuals had been charged with
crimes in connection with S&L activities.
66
The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforce-
ment Act of 1989 ("FIRREA") set aside federal funds to protect the
customers of S&Ls that had failed. 67 This legislation reorganized
the regulation and insurance system for S&Ls. FSLIC was replaced
by the Savings Association Insurance Fund, and the FDIC was put
in charge of administrating that fund. 68 The legislation appropri-
ated an initial allocation of $50 billion to close down insolvent thrifts
and pay off depositors.'69 The legislation also abolished the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board and replaced it with the newly formed Of-
fice of Thrift Supervision, which was a bureau of the Treasury De-
partment.170
The Resolution Trust Corporation ("RTC") was established in
1989 to take over failed S&Ls, pay off their depositors and then sell
their assets.'7 1 The RTC quickly became one of the largest managers
of financial and real estate properties in the United States. 72 The
final cost to American taxpayers for the S&L crisis proved to be
much less than originally estimated, but still totaled at least $90 bil-
lion.7 This entire debacle was strong evidence that the regulatory
structure in the United States was not constructed on the basis of
165. See KITTY CALAvITA, HENRY N. PONTELL & ROBERT H. TILLMAN, FRAUD AND
POLITICS IN THE SAVINGS & LOAN CRISIS 27-28 (1997).
166. See id. at 28. The government even brought an enforcement action against
Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hayes & Handler, a large New York law firm, for representing
Charles Keating's Lincoln Savings & Loan that was engaged in a broad range of ques-
tionable activities. See MACEY & MILLER, supra note 136, at 341-343; Howell E. Jackson,
Reflections of Kay, Scholer: Enlisting Launers to Improve the Regulation of Financial Institu-
tions, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1019 (1993).
167. See Richard Wei, United States v. Winstar: Renewed Government Liability Aris-
ing Front the Savings and Loan Crisis?, 1 N. C. Bank. Inst. 372 (1997).
168. See KENNETmJ. THYGERSON, FINANCIAL MARKETS AND INSTITUTIONS, A MANA-
GERIAL APPROACH 379 (1993).
169. See WOLFSON, supra note 128, at 131.
170. See id.
171. See H.R. REP. No. 101-54, pt. I, at 123 (1989).
172. See LONG, supra note 149, at 48-49.
173. See Japan's Financial Crisis, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 6,1997, at 81. A decisionby
the Supreme Court which held that federal regulators had improperly changed ac-
counting rules for the S&Ls is expected to add many billions to this bill. See Paul
Sweeney, How to Win Big in Court and Never See a Launer, N. Y. TIMES, Nov. 1,1998, at
10 (Business Section).
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scientific principles. A prime culprit appeared to be the artificial
regulatory restrictions on S&Ls that led them to try to play catch-up
through speculative investments. The fact that they were dealing
with insured funds relieved the depositors of any responsibility for
monitoring the S&Ls investments. It was free money, and the un-
scrupulous were quick to take advantage.1
4
I. Banking Changes
In the early 1990s, the only states that allowed interstate
branches were Alaska, Nevada, New York, North Carolina, Oregon
and Rhode Island.' By the middle of the 1990s, every state was
permitting multi-office banking.176 Yet, "no commercial banking
organization was even close to establishing a truly nationwide fran-
chise."' ' That situation would quickly change. Interstate banking
on a regional basis had begun in the 1980s,' and the Riegle-Neal
Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 finally
opened the door widely to interstate banking.' That legislation al-
174. Loan brokers divided large deposits into amounts of $100,000, the maximum
amount covered by federal insurance. Those deposits were then placed with several
banks. This allowed investors to avoid credit risk concerns, and the brokers would
shop for the highest CD rates. The bank regulators sought to stop this practice, view-
ing it as an abuse of federal insurance. The Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia, however, ruled that the FDIC and FSLIC could not adopt a rule that limited
insurance coverage to $100,000 per money broker per institution where funds were
being placed by a broker. See FAIC Sec. Co., Inc. v. United States, 768 F.2d 352, 361
(D.C. Cir. 1985). Later, in 1989, limits were placed by Congress on the amount of bro-
kered deposits that an institution could accept. See CAPATIDES, supra note 130, at 54.
175. See Hayley M. Brady & Mark V. Purpura, Note, The Riegle-Neal Amendments
Act of1997: The Impact of Interstate Branching on the Dual Banking System, 2 N.C. BANK.
INST. 230, 233, n.29 (1998).
176. See MACEY & MILLER, supra note 136, at 407.
177. SeeJOHNSPIEGEL, ALLEN GART& STEVEN GART, BANKING REDEFINED, How Su-
PERREGIONAL PowERHousEs ARE RESHAPING FINANCIAL SERVICES 472 (1999).
178. The Garn-St Germain Act of 1982 furthered the trend toward interstate bank-
ing by allowing interstate mergers of banks and thrifts. See D'ARiSTA 2, supra note 111,
at369. Maine, New York and Alaska adopted legislation that provided for reciprocal
branching. Regional interstate banking pacts were also adopted by groups of states
that encouraged interstate banking. See BIN ZHou, BANKING GEoGRAPHY OF THE UNIrED
STATES 17 (1997). A Southeastern State Compact allowed the banks in those states to
acquire or start banks in any of the signatory states. See generally MARTIN MAYER, THE
BANKERS, THE NEXT GENERATION 242 (1997).
179. See ZHOU, supra note 178, at 18.
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lowed bank holding companies to acquire banks in any state, and
after July 1,1997, merge multiple banks together, retaining the in-
terstate as branches of the main bank.18 °
Banks also began to introduce ATMs (automated teller ma-
chines) as a way of expanding their reach. When the Comptroller of
the Currency ruled that those machines were not branches, 8 ' ATMs
spread across America. 82 By 1996, there were some 120,000 ATMs
in the United States that were dispensing $9 billion in cash a year.'83
Grocery stores even became a favorite location for banking cen-
180. Banks were allowed to open interstate branches without having to create a
separate banking corporation in each state. See Introduction, 1 N.C. Banking Inst. xiii,
xvii (1997); Brady & Purpura, supra note 175, at 230. States could opt in or out of this
legislation. Forty-eight states opted into the Riegle-Neal interstate branching provi-
sions. See ZHOU, supra note 178, at 18; HAL S. Scorr & PHILIP A. WELLONS, INTERNA-
TIONAL FINANCE 132-133 (1996); Brady & Purpura, supra note 175, at 235. Only Texas
and Montana did not accede to these provisions. See Kyle Marshall, Banks in Stores
Catching on Fast, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh), Jan. 4,1997 at D1. Later, the Riegle-Neal
Amendments Act of 1997 gave host states control over interstate branches within their
jurisdiction to the same extent that the host state's laws would control the interstate
branches of national banks. See Brady & Purpura, supra note 175, at 230-231.
181. Some courts had held that ATMs were branches, which would have sharply
restricted their use. See Independent Bankers Association of America v. Smith, 534
F.2d 921, 951 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 862 (1976). The Comptroller of the Cur-
rency eased that problem by ruling shared ATMs were not "established and operated"
by a national bank and thus were not subject to the McFadden Act's branch limita-
tions. These were ATMs that were owned by an independent organization that shared
the ATM with the banks. See Donald C. Langevoort, Interpreting the McFadden Act: The
Politics and Economics of Shared ATMs and Discount Brokerage Houses, 41 Bus. LAw. 1265,
1273-1274 (1986). Many states reacted by decreeing that ATMs were not branches un-
der state law, permitting state chartered banks to establish ATMs across state lines.
182. About 50,000 ATMs were in operation in the United States by 1983. That
amount nearly doubled by 1990. See Bruce Zagaris and Scott D. MacDonald, Money
Laundering, Financial Fraud, and Technology: The Perils of an Instantaneous Economy, 26
GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & EcoN. 1, 71 (1992). ATMs raised some new legal problems.
ATM access cards were lost and stolen in large numbers, and the courts were asked to
sort out issues of liability between the bank and the depositors when ATM cards were
used improperly. See D'ARIsrA2, supra note 111, at148, n.38. Robberies at ATMs were
raised additional security concerns. New York City eventually adopted an ATM secu-
rity law, but crimes connected with the ATMs still increased. See Jim King, Business
Report: On Banking, ATLANTA CONSTITUTION, Dec. 10,1993, at G2.
Technology was making other inroads. S&Ls and banks were allowed to make
pre-authorized transfers from savings accounts for household payments in 1970. In
1975, telephone transfers were allowed for savings balances at commercial banks.
Banks and thrifts were using automatic transfer services for savings balances in 1978.
Credit unions were using share drafts for withdrawals. See FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF
NEw YORK, UNDERSrANDING THE M's iN MONETARY Poucy (1994).
183. See MAYER, supra note 178, at 141.
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ters. 184
The 1980s witnessed a change from "relationship" banking
to "transactional" banking. Previously, banks had depended on es-
tablished relationships with customers as the basis for their lending
business. The banks were constantly trying to expand their rela-
tionships by acquiring new customers. That approach was being
abandoned. Instead, banks began selling by product line to custom-
ers with whom they did not always have a relationship. Banks had
several products to offer, including cash management services and
computerized programs that allowed corporations to readily access
their cash positions and bank accounts, as well as to transfer bal-
ances and funds. 85
The securitization of assets transformed banks from deposit
takers and loan makers into conduits for loans as underwriters and
distributors.'86 Mezzanine finance became an important market for
banks. This is debt located between senior debt and common equity
in corporate capital structures. 8 7 Banks were engaging in loan par-
184. See Introduction, 1 N.C. BANKING INST. xiii, xxiii (1997).
185. See WILSON, supra note 38, at 284.
186. GNMA popularized the pass through mortgage security in which mortgage
loans were pooled and interests in the pool sold to investors. This asset backed debt
instrument provided additional funding for new mortgages when interests in the pool
were sold. Asset-backed debt spread to private mortgage transactions. The originators
of these programs were often banks that packaged their mortgages in a pool and sold
bonds that were secured by those mortgages. See Alan Kronovet, Note, An Overview of
Commercial Mortgage Backed Securitization: The Devil is In the Details, 1 N. C. BANKING
INsT. 288,293-294 (1997). Banks and other financial institutions soon found themselves
originating mortgages, placing them in a pool, selling participations in the pool to in-
vestors and then using the proceeds to generate further mortgages. See ZWEIG, supra
note 107, at 805. In the process, those banks were acting more like conduits than the
traditional mortgage granting financial institutions of the past. See generally, S. Rep.
No. 293, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1983); KENNETH G. LORE, MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURI-
TIES, DEVELOPMENTS AND TRENDS IN THE SECONDARY MORTGAGE MARKET (1994). The
securitization concept later expanded to include credit card balances and other cash
flows. Over $150 billion of non-mortgage asset-backed securities were issued in 1991
for such things as automobile loans, credit card receivables, computer and airplane
leases, mobile homes, vacation time shares, and recreational vehicle loans. See SEC
DIVISION OF INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT, PROTECTING INVESTORS: A HALF CENTURY OF
INVESTMENT COMPANY REGULATION 11-13 (1992).
187. Such debt included subordinated debt, junior subordinated debt or even
preferred stock. Warrants were attached to some of these loans to provide an upside
to banks. See John R. Willis & David A. Clark, Introduction to Mezzanine Finance and
Private Equity, in NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN COMMERCIALBANKING 323 (Donald Chew ed.,
1991).
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ticipations in which loans were originated and sold off to a group of
banks to spread the risk.'88 Syndicated lending reached a value of
$1 trillion in 1997.89 Banks continued to account for a significant
portion of the underwriting of state and municipal bonds.'90 Home
equity lines became popular in the 1980s.' 9' Driven by floating ex-
change rates, foreign exchange trading in the inter-bank currency
market was totaling about $60 billion a day in New York in 1986.
That figure would increase to over $100 billion in 1989. Worldwide,
average daily foreign exchange trading at that time was $1 tril-
lion. 92 The banks appeared to be less and less like banks and more
and more like financial services firms.
The banks increased their role in providing financial ser-
vices. This included "selling stocks and bonds, providing advice on
mergers and acquisitions, concocting new fangled financial prod-
ucts and trading." " Banks were offering instruments that had ele-
ments of securities and commodity futures and options. One such
product was indexed certificates of deposit. These included the
bulls/bears CDs that were issued by Chase Manhattan Bank. The
return on this certificate was based on fluctuations in the Standard
& Poor's 500 stock market index. The College Savings Bank of
Princeton, New Jersey offered tuition-linked certificates of deposit.
The depositor's return from these CDs was based on an increase in
an index of tuition, room and board for 500 colleges and universi-
ties.'94 Franklin Savings and Loan Association in Kansas began of-
fering certificates of deposit that provided a rate of return of three
percentage points above the rate of inflation.'
188. See id. at 111.
189. See Matt Murray & Paul Beckett, Syndicated Lending is Seen Falling in '98,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 15,1998, at C1.
190. See D'ARTA 2, supra note 111, at 237.
191. See id. at 273.
192. See CAPATDES, supra note 130, at 194.
193. See Timothy L. O'Brien, Chase's Global Pit Boss, N. Y. TIMEs, Jan. 16,1998, at
D1.
194. See CAPATIDES, supra note 130, at 44.
195. See id. Gold-linked certificates of deposit were being offered by the Wells
Fargo Bank. These certificates gave the customer the option of receiving interest at a
set rate or a return that was based on increases in the price of gold. The CFTC, how-
ever, sued Wells Fargo, contending that these were illegal commodity options. Wells
Fargo agreed to an injunction against further offerings of these instruments. See Jerry
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Banks were becoming more involved in commodity futures
markets activities.'96 The banking regulators were of the view that
futures trading activities were closely related to banking and per-
missible under the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956.'m In 1982,
the Fed approved the application of J.P. Morgan & Co., Inc. to estab-
lish a futures commission merchant affiliate that would be regulated
by the CFTC. It was to deal in futures contracts involving bullion
and foreign exchange, United States government securities, money
market instruments and Eurodollar certificates of deposit.' 98 About
the same time, the Fed authorized Bankers Trust to establish a fu-
tures commission merchant (B.T. Markets Corp.) that would trade
for customers in futures contracts on United States government se-
curities, money market interest rates, foreign exchange and bul-
lion. 199
W. Markham, Regulation ofHybrid Instruments Under the Connodity Exchange Act:A Call
for Alternatives, Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 1, 24 (1990).
196. See CAPATIDES, supra note 130, at 185-186. Banks had traditionally used the
commodity futures markets in their crop financing programs. Those programs often
required the commodities being financed to be hedged by futures contracts. See Jerry
W. Markham & David J. Gilberg, Federal Regulation of Bank Activities in the Commodity
Markets 39 Bus. LAW. 1719, 1766-1767 (1984).
197. See Markham & Gilberg, supra note 196, at 1743.
198. See id.
199. See id. at 1747. Banks would become involved in the marketing of so-called
over-the-counter derivatives or hybrid instruments. These included gold and silver
bullion transactions on a twenty-four hour basis on the London and other futures mar-
kets. See id. at 1769.
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K. The Glass-Steagall Act
The banks were intruding into the securities business. The
securities industry was able to slow this process by court challenges.
For example, in Securities Industry Association v. Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System,2"' the Supreme Court held that Bankers
Trust Co. could not market commercial paper for its corporate cus-
tomers.2"' The Court held in Investment Company Institute v. Camp,2"2
that commercial banks could not offer commingled investment ac-
counts because of the provisions of the Glass-Steagall Act.20 3 Nev-
ertheless, the reintegration of the banks back into the securities
business was inexorable, especially since it appeared that their very
survival was dependent on it. The bank regulators recognized this
fact and continued to open the door wider for the banks to expand
their securities activities.
The banks then began to exploit the provisions of section 20
of the Glass-Steagall Act, which prohibited bank securities affiliates
from being "principally engaged" in the investment banking aspects
onnon-exempt securities transactions. In Securities Industry Associa-
tion v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the District of
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Fed could properly
allow bank affiliates to engage in up to five percent of ineligible se-
curities activities without running afoul of the Glass-Steagall prohi-
bition that bank affiliates not be "principally engaged" in such
200. 468 U.S. 137 (1984).
201. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia later held that banks
could make private placements of third party commercial paper on an agency basis
without violating the Glass-Steagall Act. See Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Gov-
ernors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 807 F.2d 1052 (D. C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied 483 U.S. 1005
(1987).
202. 401 U.S. 617 (1971).
203. See id. In Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 472 F.2d 427 (1st Cir. 1972), the Court
held that it was illegal for a national bank to operate a travel agency because such ac-
tivities were not incidental to the powers of a bank under the National Bank Act. The
District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Federal Reserve had gone
too far in finding that courier services were incidental to banking for non-financially
related courier services. See National Courier Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed.
Reserve Sys., 516 F.2d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 1975). In another case, a federal court held that
banks could not provide data processing services to merchants unless it was limited to
banking activities. National Retailers Corp. of Arizona v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 411 F.
Supp. 308 (D.Ariz. 1976), affd, 604 F.2d 32 (9th Cir. 1979).
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activity. 214
The Comptroller of the Currency authorized the Security Pa-
cific National Bank to create a subsidiary called Discount Brokerage
Service in August of 1982.2"5 Thereafter, more than 200 banks cre-
ated joint ventures with discount brokers. The Fed also concluded
that discount brokerage services were closely related to bank activi-
ties and, therefore, permissible under the Bank Holding Company
Act.2"6 In 1983, the Fed approved the acquisition by BankAmerica
Corporation of Charles Schwab, the nation's largest discount broker.
That action was upheld by the Supreme Court in Securities Industry
Association v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.2" 7 Nu-
merous banks entered the discount brokerage business following
this ruling.2 8
Although they were still hobbled by banking restrictions that
limited their ability to cross-sell non-traditional commercial bank
services, the banks continued to seek to offer financial services. In
Board of Governors v. Investment Company Institute, 9 the Supreme
Court held that the Fed could permit bank holding companies to act
as investment advisors to closed-end investment companies. The
Comptroller of the Currency later allowed banks to manage IRA
funds in a common trust fund. This was upheld by a Court of Ap-
peals. 21"
The SEC was not unmindful of these intrusions into the secu-
rities business. The SEC adopted a rule in 1985 that would have re-
quired banks to register with it, if the banks were engaged in the
securities business. The Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
204. Securities Industry Association v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, 839 F.2d 47 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1059 (1988). The Fed ruling permit-
ted bank affiliates to engage in up to 5% of ineligible securities activities. See MAcFX &
MILER, supra note 136, at 547-549. This was increased to 10% in 1989, and to 25% in
1996. See id.
205. See D'ARJSTA 2, supra note 111, at 311.
206. See id. at 77.
207. 716 F.2d 92 (1983).
208. See Penny Lunt, What Have Banks Learned About Selling Securities?, A.B.A.
BANKNG J., Jan. 1, 1993, available in 1993 WL 3004438.
209. 450 U.S. 46 (1981).
210. See id. See CAPATDES, supra note 130, at 95-96.
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bia held that the rule exceeded the SEC's authority.2" Congress was
also becoming concerned with the intrusion of banks into the securi-
ties industry. The Competitive Equality Banking Act of 19872 12im-
posed a one-year moratorium on Fed approval of further securities
activities by banks. That slowed the banks only briefly.213 The Sen-
ate passed a bill that would have essentially repealed the Glass-
Steagall Act in 1988. This proposed legislation would have allowed
the banks to create subsidiaries that could engage in a broad range
of securities activities. The House of Representatives did not adopt
a similar bill, but this did not discourage bank regulators from con-
tinuing to take an expansive view of what activities were appropri-
ate for bank holding companies.2"4
L. Bank Restructuring Continues
Even with an expanded business base, the number of banks
had declined from around 14,000 in 1980 to under 10,000 in 1995.
This statistic reflected the fact that a "massive restructuring" of the
211. See American Bankers Ass'n v Securities and Exch. Comm'n, 804 F.2d 739
(D. C. Cir. 1986).
212. Pub. L. No. 100-86, 101 Stat. 552.
213. Among the things that the Federal Reserve Board has concluded to be
closely related to banking by the 1990s were trust company functions, acting as an in-
vestment or financial advisor to real estate or mortgage trusts or to investment compa-
nies, leasing personal or real property, acting as underwriter for credit life insurance
and credit accident and health insurance directly related to an extension of credit, pro-
viding courier service for checks and commercial papers and documents exchanged
among banks and financial institutions, providing management consulting advice to
non-affiliated banks and non-bank depository institutions, issuing money orders un-
der $1,000 and selling travelers checks and savings bonds, performing appraisals of
real estate, arranging commercial real estate equity financing by acting as an interme-
diary, providing security and brokerage services, individual retirement accounts and
cash management services, underwriting and dealing in obligations of the United
States and other government bodies, providing foreign exchange and advisory transac-
tional services including swaps through separate subsidiaries, acting through a sepa-
rate subsidiary as a futures commission merchant in executing and clearing
transactions on commodity exchanges for futures contracts for bullion, foreign ex-
change, government securities and money market instruments, providing investment
advice on financial futures and options on futures, providing tax planning and prepa-
ration services, offering check guaranty services, operating an agency for collecting
overdue accounts receivable, and operating a credit bureau. See 12 C.F.R. § 225.28
(1999). See also MACEY & MILLER, supra note 136, at 355-356 (discussing Reg Y).
214. See CAPATnDES, supra note 130, at 1-2.
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banking industry was occurring through mergers and acquisi-
tions.2"' A new form of bank was emerging in the early 1990s.
These were super-regional banks. They included Banc One Corpo-
ration, First Chicago/NBD Corporation, Fleet Financial, Norwest
Corporation, CoreStates, First Union, Wachovia Corporation, Wells
Fargo and NationsBank.2"6 These enterprises became even more ag-
gressive in seeking to expand their business base.
A number of states had for years allowed state chartered
banks to provide insurance services to their customers.2"7 Several
states authorized mutual savings banks to engage in the insurance
business. South Dakota allowed state chartered banks to engage in
a full range of insurance activities.2"' National banks had been
sharply restricted in their insurance activities" 9 until the Comptrol-
ler ruled in 1990 that sales of credit insurance, disability insurance
and title insurance were incidental to the business of banking.220
The Comptroller found other insurance and annuity activities to be
incidental to the banking powers of national banks. This included
credit life insurance, which seeks to insure a loan against the event
of a death or disability of the borrower.22' National banks also ex-
ploited a loophole in the National Bank Act that authorized national
banks to sell insurance as agents from communities with a popula-
tion under 5,000.222
215. See SPEGEL, GART & GART, supra note 177, at xiii.
216. See generally SPIEGEL, GART & GART, supra note 177.
217. See MACEY & MILLER, supra note 136, at 384.
218. See D'ARsTA 2, supra note 111, at 78.
219. See Laura Turner Beyer, North Carolina Banking in 1997: The Year in Review,
2 N.C. BANKING INST. i, xviii (1998).
220. See Leigh Rabemacher, Powers of National Banks to Sell Insurance, Annuities
and Securities from Bank Premises, 30 CREIGHTON L REv. 753, 754 (1997); CLIFFORD E.
KIRscH, THE FINANCIAL SERVICES REVOLUTION, UNDERANDING THE CHANGING ROLE OF
BANKS, MUTUAL FUNDS, AND INSURANCE COMPANIES 72 (1997).
221. See Julie L. Williams, et al., After Barnett: The intersection of National Bank In-
surance Powers and State Regulation, 1 N. C. BANKING INST. 13,15 (1997). The Comptrol-
ler concluded that title and municipal bond insurance were functionally equivalent to
a standby letter of credit See American Ins. Ass'n v. Clarke, 865 F.2d 278 (D.C. Cir.
1989). The Comptroller also allowed banks to engage in mortgage reinsurance. See
Williams, supra note 221, at 20.
222. See 12 U.S.C. § 92; Rabemacher, supra note 220, at 754-755. The Comptroller
allowed banks to operate insurance agencies out of those small communities even
where their main office was located in a large city. See Williams, supra note 221, at 17.
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The national banks were given a boost in their efforts to in-
trude into the insurance industry in 1995 after the Supreme Court
held in NationsBank v. Variable Annuity Life Insurance Company,223
that a national bank could sell fixed and variable rate annuities. The
Court further held that annuities were investments rather than in-
surance.224 The Fed began permitting bank holding companies to
sell insurance.225 The Gain-St Germain Act of 1982, however, pro-
hibited the Fed from considering underwriting of insurance as an
activity that is "closely related to banking."26 In December of 1996,
the Comptroller of the Currency adopted amendments to its regula-
tions that allowed even further intrusion by bank subsidiaries into
the insurance business. 227 The Supreme Court held in Barnett Bank of
Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson,228 that state legislation could not re-
strict national banks from selling insurance. By 1996, most banks
were selling some form of life insurance product.229 In 1997, banks
were then selling twenty-five to thirty percent of the insurance in-
dustry's annuities.23 °
The banks could no longer depend on the deposit business as
their prime basis for generating revenues. This was underscored by
the fact that, by 1993, commercialbank deposits were exceeded in
amount by the funds held by mutual funds. 231 The banks responded
to that threat by creating their own mutual funds, and continued
their efforts of aggressively pursuing other securities related busi-
A court held that national bank offices in towns of less than 5,000 could be used to sell
insurance to customers nationwide. See Independent Ins. Agents of America, Inc. v
Ludwig, 997 F.2d 968 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Julie L. Williams, et al., After Barnett: The Intersec-
tion of National Bank Insurance Powers and State Regulations, 1 N. C. BANKING INST. 13,15-
16 (1997).
223. 513 U.S. 251 (1995).
224. See generally Rabemacher, supra note 220, at 761.
225. See ZWEIG, supra note 107, at 809.
226. See J. Virgil Mattingly & Keiran J. Fallon, Understanding the Issues Raised bj
Financial Modernization 2 N.C. BANKING INsT. 25, 29-30 (1998).
227. See Linda B. Tigges, Note, Functional Regulation of Bank Insurance Activities:
The Time Has Come, 2 N.C. BANKING INST. 455,468 (April 1998).
228. 517 U.S. 25 (1996).
229. See Michael D. White, What Will It Take for Bank Insurance to Succeed in the
United States? 2 N.C. BANKING INST. 123,129 (1998).
230. See KIRSCH, supra note 220, at 85.
231. See JERRY W. MARKHAM & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, BROKER-DEALER OPERATIONS
UNDER SECURrrIES AND COMMODrrIEs LAW § 2.09[7], at 2-141 (1997).
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ness.232 In 1993, a third of all mutual funds were being sold through
banks.233 Banks were offering "private label" mutual funds as well
as those of other organizations.234
As the century aged, the banks continued to drop their tradi-
tional lending business and increase their role in financial services
such as selling securities, engaging in repos, providing advice on
mergers and creating and selling derivative instruments such as
swaps.235 By the middle of the 1990s, many of the larger banks were
receiving from one-third to over fifty percent of their revenues from
non-interest income. 236 By 1994, banks were involved in selling
United States Treasury securities, lease and other asset backed secu-
rities, municipal securities, corporate bonds, corporate equities, fi-
nancial and precious metal futures, as well as bullion. They were
232. See Conrad de Aenlle, Banks Follow Clients to Funds, INTERNATIONAL HERALD-
TRIBUNE, Feb. 27, 1993, available in 1993 WL 9774806.
233. See Penny Lunt, How Are Mutual Funds Changing Banks?, A.B.A. BANKINGJ.,
June 1,1993, available in 1993 WL 3004317. In 1993, Concord Holding Corp, which had
been created in 1987, was administering and distributing mutual funds for banks. At
that time, it was handling over $36 billion in assets. There were some 16 similar firms
that were operating mutual funds for banks in order to avoid Glass-Steagall prohibi-
tions on banks underwriting activities. See Alyssa A. Lappen, Fund Follies, INSTITU-
TIONAL INVESTOR, Oct. 1, 1993, available in 1993 WL 12229261. Mellon Bank acquired
Dreyfus and became the largest bank manager of mutual funds. It was also the second
largest asset manager in the United States. See SPIEGEL, GART& GART, supra note 177, at
300. For descriptions of other bank mutual fund arrangements, see Marcia Parker,
Crains New York Business, 1993 WL 2989529 (Apr. 19,1993); Stan Hinden, Banks Picking
Mutual Funds Face Questions on Disclosure ofRisks, WASINGTON POST, Mar. 24,1993, at
F3.
First Union bought Lieber & Co. in 1993. It was the manager of $2.2 billion
dollars of Evergreen Mutual Funds. See Jane Bennett, Banks Using Mutual Funds to Keep
Customers, THE JACKSONVILLE BUSNESS JOURNAL, Dec. 31, 1993, available in 1993 WL
3026956. First Union announced in 1996 that it was seeking to have $100 billion in
mutual fund asset sales by the year 2000. See Introduction, 1 N.C. Banking Inst. xiii, xix
(1997). First Union had earlier announced that it was training 2,600 employees to sell
mutual funds including 12 of its own funds by the end of 1994. In the following year,
NationsBank added 11 mutual funds to its 28 mutual funds that were already under its
management. See Rick Brooks, Banks Rush to Offer Blitz of Mutual Funds, CHARLOTE
BUSINESS JOURNAL, July 12,1993, available in 1993 WL 2988430. Citibank was selling a
family of mutual funds, after regulatory changes allowed the banks to use their names
in selling such securities. See Julie Creswell, Citibank Fund Group to Get a Change of
Name, But Will It Help Returns?, WALL ST. J., Feb. 17,1998, at 8B.
234. See ZWEIG, supra note 107, at 807.
235. See Timothy L. O'Brien, Chase's Global Pit Boss, N. Y. TIMES, Jan. 16,1998, at
D1.
236. See SPIEGEL, GART& GART, supra note 177, at40.
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acting in private placements as agents, were sponsoring closed end
investment funds and were offering deposit accounts with returns
that were tied to stock market performance. Other bank activities
included Eurodollar dealings, mergers and acquisitions, trust in-
vestments, automatic investment services, dividend investment ser-
vices, financial advising, discount brokerage activities, securities
swaps and research services.237 Chemical Bank reported revenues of
$1 billion based on proprietary trading activities in 1993. Bankers
Trust made more profits from trading than from its lending activi-
ties during the first quarter of 1994,238 in fact some seventy percent
of its first quarter profits in 1994 came from derivative products.3
In total, banks accounted for some $12 to $14 trillion dollars of de-
rivatives sold in the United States in 1994.240 Though at one point,
over fifty percent of revenue for Bankers Trust was from derivatives
transactions; some of those gains would turn sour when Bankers
Trust was sued by customers that experienced large losses from
those transactions.24' The top dealers in over-the-counter deriva-
tives in 1993 were Chemical Bank, Citicorp, Bankers Trust, Societe
Generale, J.P. Morgan, and the Union Bank of Switzerland.242 Citi-
corp was earning most of its profits in the emerging markets in
1997.243
The barriers between investment banking and commercial
banking continued to erode. The Bank Service Corporation Act al-
lowed banks to operate service corporations that could perform
back office services for banks and certain other activities.244 The
Comptroller adopted regulations in 1996 that permitted national
banks to establish "operating subsidiaries" to engage in activities
237. See KIRScH, supra note 220, at 11.
238. See Jerry W. Markham, "Confederate Bonds," "General Custer," and the Regula-
tion of Derivative Financial Instruments, 25 SETON HALL L. REv. 1, 68-69, n. 262 (1994).
239. See id. at 68-69, n.262.
240. See id. at 48, n.198.
241. See id. at 37, n.155.
242. See KMsc, supra note 220, at 146.
243. See Richard Waters, Citicorp Warns of Squeeze On Lending, FIN. TIMEs, July16,
1997, at 15.
244. See John L. Douglas, Technology and Banking, 1 N.C. BANKING INST. 59,66-67
(1997).
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that national banks could not engage in directly.245 Although Zions
First National Bank was given permission to deal in municipal
revenue bonds through its operating subsidiary; such dealings had
been traditionally prohibited for national banks under Glass-
Steagall as investment banking activities.246
The Fed announced in December of 1996 that it was increas-
ing from ten to twenty-five percent the amount of total revenues
that a non-bank subsidiary of a bank holding company could derive
from underwriting and dealing in securities.24 This allowed banks
to expand their securities activities in their Section 20 affiliates un-
der the Glass-Steagall Act.248 It was thought that these changes
would allow "one stop financial shopping at banks and bank hold-
ing companies."249 This change enabled Bankers Trust to acquire
Alexander Brown in 1997 through a share swap transaction valued
at $1.7 billion.2 0 U.S. Bancorp announced the acquisition of Piper
Jaffrey Co. in December of 1997. Piper Jaffrey was then the eleventh
largest securities firm in the United States.25 ' First Union acquired
Wheat First Butcher Singer, a broker-dealer based in Richmond,
Virginia.2" 2 Swiss Bank Corporation announced in May of 1997 that
it was acquiring Dillon Read for some $600 million.2"3 In July of
1997, NationsBank Corporation purchased Montgomery Securities,
245. See Mattingly & Fallon, supra note 225, at 57; Linda B. Tigges, Note, Func-
tional Regulation of Bank Insurance Activities: The Time Has Come, 2 N.C. BANKING INST.
455,468 (1998).
246. See T. McCuiston, Note, National Banks Operating Subsidiaries: How Far Has
the OCC Opened the Door to Nonbanking Activities?, 2 N.C. BANKING INST. 264 (1998).
247. See Revenue Limit on Bank-Ineligible Activities of Subsidiaries of Bank
Holding Companies Engaged in Underwriting and Dealing in Securities, 61 Fed. Reg.
68750 (1996).
248. See R. Nicholas Rodelli, Note, The New Operating Standards for Section 20 Sub-
sidiaries: The Federal Reserve Board's Prudent March Toward Financial Services Moderniza-
tion, 2 N.C. BANKING INST. 311 (1998).
249. See David R. Satin, Breaking Down the Wall, The Unofficial End of Glass-Steagall,
BANK SEC. J. at 11,11 (July/August, 1997).
250. See Charles V. Bagli, ING Is Negotiating to Buy Remainder of Dillon, Read, N.Y.
TIMES, May 2,1997, at C6. See also, Merge On, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 12, 1997, at 5.
251. See What's News, WALL ST. J., Dec. 16, 1997, at Al.
252. See Beyer, supra note 219, at v.
253. See Tracy Corrigan & George Graham, SBC Wins Place on Wall St, FIN. TIMES,
May 16,1997, at 32.
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an investment banking firm in San Francisco, for $1.2 billion."4 Wa-
chovia Bank paid $230 million for Interstate/Johnson Lane, a re-
gional brokerage firm in the Carolinas in October of 1998.255
These changes were dramatically altering the business of
banking. The erosion of the barriers between investment banking
and commercial banking led one paper to conclude that J.P. Morgan
was looking increasingly more like an investment bank.25 6 The new
role being played by banks was illustrated by a two page adver-
tisement in the Wall Street Journal in February of 1998 that an-
nounced NationsBank's results for the prior year. In that year, the
bank handled initial public offerings worth $4.5 billion; high-yield
("junk bond") transactions worth $16.7 billion; mergers and acquisi-
tions worth $14.5 billion; "follow-ons" worth $11.8 billion; syndi-
cated floating rate debt of $442 billion; convertible securities
underwritten in the amount of $3.7 billion; private placements
worth $940 million; real estate finance valued at $30.2 billion; high-
grade securities underwritings of $30.6 billion; asset-backed securi-
ties underwritings at $22.5 billion and project finance of $5.7 bil-
lion.257
M. Glass-Steagall Falls At Last
Four record-setting banking acquisitions occurred in the first
half of 1995. They were Fleet Financial and Shawmet National; First
Union and First Fidelity; First Chicago and NBD; and Chemical
Bank and Chase Manhattan.5 8 In another merger, Security Pacific
joined BankAmerica. 2 9 In 1996, NationsBank went on a binge of
acquisitions that included Boatmen's Bancshares, Inc. in St. Louis
254. See Peter Truell, NationsBank Confirms a $1.2 Billion Deal for Montgomery N.Y.
TiMES, July 1,1997, at D5; Beyer, supra note 219,at iii.
255. See Rah Bickley, Wachovia Paying $230 Million in Stock for Brokerage Firm,
NEws & OBSERVER (Raleigh), Oct. 28,1998, at D1.
256. See The Changing World ofJ P Morgan, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 2,1997, at 13.
257. See 1997 Results- $559 Billion in Transactions, WALLST. J., Feb. 11, 1998, at A12
(advertisement by NationsBank).
258. See SPIEGEL, GART & GART, supra note 177, at 64.
259. See Floyd Norris, As More Banks Vanish, Wall St. Cheers, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 29,
1995, at D1.
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for $8.7 billion.26° A year later, NationsBank purchased Barnett
Banks, Inc., a banking group in Florida, for over $14 billion.26' Be-
tween 1985 and 1997, First Union National Bank of North Carolina
made seventy-five acquisitions,262 including the purchase of Core-
States Financial Corporation in a transaction valued at over $17 bil-
lion.263
In March of 1998, Washington Mutual bought H. F. Ahman-
son for $10 billion. With that merger, Washington Mutual would
have assets of $150 billion.2" Norwest, a Minneapolis bank, an-
nounced in June of 1998 that it was acquiring Wells Fargo in a stock
swap that was valued at $31.2 billion.26" The merger of Bank One
and First Chicago made BankOne the largest bank in the Midwest,
and one of the larger issuer of credit cards in the United States.266
National City agreed to buy the First of America Bank for over $6
billion in stock in 1997.2"7 In April of 1998, Citicorp announced a
planned merger with Travelers Group, Inc. which owned Salomon
Brothers and Smith Barney.2 6 8 The value of this merger was set at
$83 billion.269 Before its merger with Travelers Group, Citicorp had
relationships with one in five households in the United States.
The combined entity had more than 100 million customers world
wide, and it offered a wide range of products that varied from cor-
260. See Send in the Marine, THE EcoNoMIST, Sep. 7,1996, at 70; Introduction, 1 N.
C. BANKING INST. xiii, xviii (March 1997).
261. See Joel B. Obermayer, First Union Buys Pa. Bank, NEWS & OBSERVER (Ra-
leigh), Nov. 19,1997, at 1A.
262. See Saul Hansell, In Northeast Bank Flux, V'/ho's Next In Line?, N. Y. TIMES,
Nov. 19, 1997, at Dl.
263. See id.
264. See Business This Week, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 21,1998, at 5.
265. See John Arthurs, US Bancorp in $2.5bn Buy-Back, FIN. TIMES, June 10,1998, at
17; Steven Lipin & Matt Murray, Wells Fargo and Norwest Near a Merger, WALL ST. J.,
June 8, 1998, at A3.
266. See Bonding, THE EcONOMiST, Apr. 18, 1998, at 7; Timothy L. O'Brien, Om-
nivorous Banks, N. Y. TIMES, Apr. 14,1998, at Al.
267. See Matt Murray, National City to Acquire First ofAmerica In a Stock Swap Val-
ued at $6.78 Billion, WALL ST. J., Dec. 2,1997, at A3.
268. See Matt Murray, Citigroup Expecting to Chop 8,000 Jobs, WALLST. J., Sep. 18,
1998, at A3.
269. See Michael Siconolfi, Big Umbrella, WALL ST. J., Apr. 7,1998, at Al.
270. See CrrIcoRP, 1997 ANNUAL REPORT 11 (1998).
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porate finance to consumer banking and securities.271 The Citigroup
amalgamation was matched by the merger of BankAmerica and
NationsBank.2  In 1998 a consolidation of banking and financial
services was also occurring in Europe as well as in the United
States. 2 3 The Deutsche Bank announced on November 23,1998 that
it was acquiring Bankers Trust for almost $10 billion.2 4 This merger
created the world's largest financial services company.27 5
Agreement was finally reached in October of 1999 on the
passage of legislation to repeal the Glass-Steagall Act.276 It was ex-
pected that this would result in a further consolidation of financial
services7 The legislation authorized the creation of financial hold-
ing companies that could engage in a broad array of financial ser-
vices including commercial and investment banking, securities and
insurance. Restrictions were eased on the grand-fathered non-bank
banks, and operating subsidiaries of national banks were given
similarly expanded powers. Unfortunately, the legislation contin-
ued efforts by Congress to control the delivery of financial services.
Even the new financial holding companies were restricted in their
ability to engage in non-financial services. The statute also imposed
restrictions on commercial firms that were seeking to enter the
banking business by buying or chartering thrifts, by eliminating the
271. Citigroup later purchased Schroders, PLC in England for $2.2 billion in
January of 2000. This acquisition was designed to boost Citigroup's investment bank-
ing activities in Europe. See Paul Beckett & Erik Portanger, Citigroup in Deal with U.K.'s
Schroders to Boost European Investment Banking, WALL ST. J., Jan. 19, 2000, at C1.
272. See generally What's News, WALL ST. J., May 21,1998, at Al.
273. See Edmund L. Andrews, Deal-Making Fever Sweeps Across Europe, N. Y.
TIMES, Nov. 25,1998, at C2.
274. See id. See also Paul Beckett, Deutsche-BT Tie May Be Felt More In Europe,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 24,1998, at A3; Timothy L. O'Brien, Global Trend Seen in German Bank
Deal, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 22, 1998, at 10 (International Section); The Battle of the Bulge
Bracket, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 28,1998, at 73.
275. See Commercial Propositions, THE ECONOMISr, Dec. 5,1998, at 96; Christopher
Rhoads, Duetsche Bank to Give BT 'No Autonomy'. WALL ST. J., Dec. 1,1998, at Al; Get-
ting There, THE ECONOMIS, Nov. 28, 1998, at 5.
276. See Michael Schroeder, Congress Passes Financial Services Bill, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 5,1999, at A2; The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102,1999
U.S.C.C.A.N. (113 Stat.) 1338. The act was signed by President William Jefferson Clin-
ton on Nov. 12,1999.
277. See Michael Schroeder, Glass-Steagall Compromise is Reached, WALLST. J., Oct.
25,1999, at A2.
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unitary thrift holding company loophole that permitted companies
owning only a single thrift to engage in any other business without
limitation under the Savings and Loan Holding Company Act. This
was directed at stopping Wal-Mart from buying or chartering a
thrift or from operating Wal-Mart brand banking operations in its
stores.278 Congress additionally continued its effort to force the
commercial banks to invest more funds into economically deprived
areas through the Community Reinvestment Act ("CRA"). Bank
competitors were not subject to similar requirements.
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, which repealed Glass-
Steagall's prohibitions on bank securities activities, maintained the
historical "functional" regulatory system as the basis for regulating
the expanded activities of the banks and their holding company
structures. This meant that traditional commercial banking activi-
ties would continue to be regulated by the bank regulators, securi-
ties activities would be regulated by the SEC and state securities
commissions, commodity futures and options activities would be
regulated by the CFTC and insurance activities would be regulated
by multiple state insurance regulators.
278. See id.
[Vol. 4264
BANKING REGULATION
N. Cyber-Finance Appears
The repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act's restrictions on bank se-
curities activities was a belated recognition of the fact that financial
services were no longer being sold in "functional" units, even
though that was way they would be continued to be regulated.
Banks were changing. They were no longer simply a place to de-
posit cash and to borrow money. In fact, cash was becoming an
anachronism. Coin and paper money accounted for only eight per-
cent of the worldwide supply of American dollars as the century
closed." 9 Checks were still popular, but electronic money was re-
placing such traditional currency in many transactions.28 ° The
amount of funds being transferred electronically by wire transfers
each day was estimated to be in the trillions of dollars.21' By 1993,
electronic transfers totaled $400 trillion in the United States.282 Over
140 domestic and foreign banks were using CHIPS in 1995.283
SWIFT was being used by 5,200 financial institutions in 137 coun-
tries.284 A bank Internet payment system project was underway in
1997. It sought to provide secure inter-bank payments through the
Internet.285
Credit cards were another form of electronic payment that
was increasing in popularity. The credit card was becoming a sub-
stantial substitute for cash in retail transactions.286 In October of
1998, Americans owned an average of three credit cards and used
them for about twenty-five percent of their spending.27 Visa and
MasterCard were responsible for seventy-five percent of all credit
279. See JACK WEATHERFORD, THE HISTORY OF MONEY 124 (1997).
280. See John L. Douglas, Technology and Banking, 1 N. C. BANKING INST. 37,45-47
(1997).
281. See Bruce Zagaris & Scott B. MacDonald, Money Laundering, Financial Fraud,
and Technology: The Perils ofan Instantaneous Economy, 26 GEO. WASH. J. INT'LL. & ECON.
61,72 (1992).
282. See WEATHERFORD, supra note 279, at 222-223.
283. See MAYER, supra note 179, at 82.
284. See MARY J. CRONIN, BANKING AND FiNANCE ON THE INTERNET 298 (1998).
285. See id. at 195.
286. Almost 200 million people were using digital cash in the form of Visa cards
around the world by 1990. See Zagaris & MacDonald, supra note 281, at 69.
287. See The More the Merrier?, THE ECONOMIsT, Oct. 10, 1998, at 32.
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card purchases in the United States,288 which totaled more than $600
billion. Their cards were accepted by more than 3.4 million stores.289
Almost 600 million Visa cards were outstanding by 1997, and they
were being accepted at more than fourteen million locations. Those
cards were used to purchase over $1 trillion dollars in goods and
services.29 ° The credit card lending activities of United States banks
were their most profitable business.29
Debit cards were gaining popularity in the United States.
These cards acted essentially as electronic checks in that the funds
were withdrawn from the customer's account upon use of the
card.292 It has been predicted that by the year 2005 debit card pay-
ments will account for forty-eight percent of total credit card trans-
actions, as compared to twenty-one percent in 1997.293 Experiments
288. See Paul Beckett, Visa, MasterCard Battle with Retailers, WALL ST. J., Nov. 24,
1998, at B12. Visa USA and MasterCard International were the targets of an antitrust
suit in October of 1998. The Justice Department was claiming that the joint ownership
of Visa and MasterCard by the same group of major banks violated the antitrust laws,
The government also claimed that the defendants were preventing banks from issuing
American Express cards. See Brian Gruley & Paul Beckett, Visa, MasterCard Named in
Antitrust Suit, WALLST. J., Oct. 8,1998, atA3. Later, in 1999, Citigroup announced that
it was removing itself from the Visa board. Citigroup was annoyed at the fact that
Visa was giving itself top billing on the card, while the banks were being given little
space for their own logos. It was thought that the larger banks would form their own
credit card franchises while the smaller banks would continue to seek the support of
the Visa card name for their cards. See John Authers, MasterCard in Boardroom Revamp,
FIN. TWMEs, Mar. 11, 1999, at 15.
289. See VISA Press Center Digital Media Kit (visited Feb. 29, 2000) <http://www-
s2.visa.com/av/press-center/digital/statistics.html>.
290. See id.
291. See Richard Waters, Citicorp Warns of Squeeze On Lending, FIN. TIMES, July 16,
1997, at 15. "NationsBank [was] among the [10] largest credit card issuers in the coun-
try." SPnEGEL, GART & GART, supra note 177, at 205.
The "merchant processing" business was an important adjunct to the credit card
industry. This business involved the obtaining of authorizations for purchases with
credit cards at the time of the purchase, processing credit card transactions and settle-
ment of those transactions and depositing funds in merchants' accounts. Many banks
engaged in those activities but the principal processors in the middle of the 1990s were
NaBANCO/First Data Systems/Card, American Express, Discover, GE Capital, Sears,
Establishment Services, First USA and National Data Corporation. See John L. Doug-
las, Banking Organizations: Structural and Other Considerations Involving Non-Banking
Activities, 1 N.C. BANKIN INST. 59, 99-100 (1997).
292. See Way to Pay, THEECONoMIsr, Oct. 4,1997, at 80. The classic credit card al-
lows customer debit balances to build. Those balances may be paid off at the end of
the month or carried forward on the basis of a loan from the credit card issuer to the
consumer. Interest rates are charged to carry those balances.
293. See Paul Beckett, Visa, MasterCard Battle with Retailers, WALL ST. J., Nov. 24,
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with "stored value cards" were being carried out as a substitute for
money. These "smart" cards were a variation of the traveler's check.
They operated through a micro chip embedded in the card.294
Smart cards could be recharged at cash machines or payment could
be made from an account or in cash to load the card up for use for
purchases.29 Super smart cards were being developed that allowed
holders to check their bank balance, make securities transactions
and perform other functions.296 Smart cards sought to act as substi-
tutes for money and were sometimes referred to as "e-purses. "297
More than seventy million smart cards were distributed in 1996. At
that time, their use was doubling annually.29 By the end of 1998,
however, it seemed that the banks were going to have to reconsider
smart cards because consumers were not expressing a great deal of
enthusiasm for this payment medium.299
An effort was underway to develop an electronic check that
1998, at B12.
294. See Kimbrelly Kegler, Note, Electronic Banking: Security, Privacy, and CRA
Compliance, 2 N.C. BANKINGINST. 426,442(1998).
295. See Chipper, for now, THEECONOMIST, April 26,1997 at 71, 77; Catherine Lee
Wilson, Banking on the Net: Extending Bank Regulation to Electronic Money and Beyond,
30 CREIGHTON L. REV. 671, 680-681 (1997).
296. See Zagaris & MacDonald, Money Laundering, Financial Fraud, and Technology:
The Perils of an Instantaneous Economy, 26 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 61, 70-71
(1992).
297. See Chipper, for now, THE ECONOMST, April 26,1997, at 77.
298. See CRONN, supra note 284, at 137.
299. See Keep the Change, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 21, 1998, at 73. See also, Paul
Beckett & Larry M. Greenberg, Smart Card Still Needs More Answers, Sponsors Concede,
As Big Test Nears End, WALL ST. J, Nov. 4,1998, at A4. VisaCash was introduced in
1996. This was a chip-based stored value card and was used at the 1996 Summer
Olympics in Atlanta, Georgia. Athletes and visitors were given reloadable smart
cards, and numerous merchants agreed to recognize those cards. Over 200,000 trans-
actions were conducted on the cards during the Olympics. See Wilson, supra note 295,
at 671. Even so, the experiment suggested that consumers might be slow in adapting
to these cards. See Saul Hansell, Got a Dime? Citibank and Chase End Test of Electronic
Cash, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4,1998, at C1. Another experiment in virtual money was un-
dertaken by Chase Manhattan Bank, Citibank, Visa USA and MasterCard International
in 1998. This program issued tens of thousands of smart cards and installed card read-
ers in about 400 stores in Manhattan. These smart cards had computer chips instead of
magnetic strips that could be loaded with as much as $500 through an ATM and used
as a substitute for cash purchases. The store owners found, however, that customers
did not like the cards. Nevertheless, the banks were still optimistic that the cards
would eventually be accepted by the public. See Lisa W. Foderaro, A Test in Cashless
Spending Turns Out to be a Hard Sell, N.Y. TIMES, July 27,1998, at B4. The smart card
would, if widely accepted, be a source of large profits for the banks. In addition to
service charges, the banks receive the benefit of the float for the funds stored on the
card.
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could be written through the Internet on a computer screen using a
digital signature."° A Cybercash system allowed a consumer to
transfer funds through the Internet when purchasing goods.3 '
DigiCash was developed in 1997 as a means to provide electronic
cash for making payments to an Internet merchant.3 2 Another sys-
tem called NetCash transmitted cash through the Internet using an
encryption scheme.30 3 First Union was offering Cybercoin, a pay-
ment service that allowed purchases to be made over the Internet." 4
A First Union executive noted a few years ago that the bank-
ing industry was seeking to eliminate the branch delivery system
and replace it with electronic banking.30 5 Banks had begun examin-
ing the concept of home banking as early as 1970.306 Initially, this
was carried out through touch tone telephones and proprietary
software that allowed customers to access account balances and
transfer funds.30 7 Web-based banking allowed greater access.3 8
Customers could transfer funds, obtain checking account balances,
pay bills, write checks, and transfer funds between accounts and
obtain current interest rates.0 9
The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency approved a
request in 1996 by Apollo Trust Company to provide home banking
services through the Internet.3" At that time, three major banks
were allowing customers to apply and receive automobile loans on-
line.3 ' Wachovia Bank in North Carolina announced in 1997 that its
300. See Wilson, supra note 295, at 671. Other forms of electronic checks were be-
ing developed that acted much like debit cards. See CRONIN, supra note 284, at 193-194;
Bill Brewer, Electronic Checking, DAILY NEWS (Naples, FL), Oct. 31, 1999, at 20.
301. See John L. Douglas, Technology and Banking, 1 N.C. BANKING INST. 37, 47
(1997).
302. See Randall W. Sifers, Regulating Electronic Money in Small-Value Payment Sys-
tems: Telecommunications Law as a Regulaton Model, 49 FED. COM. L. J. 701 (1997).
303. See id.
304. See Beyer, supra note 219, at xxiv.
305. See SPIEGEL, GART & GART, supra note 177, at 53-54.
306. See CRONIN, supra note 284, at 28.
307. See id. at 29.
308. See Heather C. Alston, Note, Will That Be Cash, Credit, or E-Money?, 1 N.C.
BANKING INST. 225,238 (1997).
309. See Kimbrelly Kegler, Note, Electronic Banking: Security, Privacy, and CRA
Compliance, 2 N.C. BANKING INST. 426,427428 (1998).
310. See Wilson, supra note 295, at 678-679.
311. See id. at 678 n. 45.
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customers could purchase stock, obtain checking account balances
and obtain stock quotations over the Internet from the bank.312
NationsBank was developing automated loan machines that would
allow unsecured personal loans of up to $10,000.313 Several banks
created Internet sites that allowed transactions to be conducted by
customers.3"4 By 1998, over 800,000 customers were conducting
online checking with 150 banks.31 5 This was an increase of four
hundred percent over the prior eight months.316
Internet banks were being established. These "virtual" banks
operated only online. They allowed their customers to open ac-
counts and to perform most of their banking activities through the
Internet. The first Internet bank was the Security First Network
bank and the second was Atlanta Internet Bank.3"' These banks ob-
tained a charter from the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
and were covered by FDIC insurance. 8 The BestBank was another
"virtual" bank that operated only on the Internet. Unfortunately, it
became bankrupt in September of 1998.' 9
III. HISTORY IS OUTSTRIPPING REGULATION
History demonstrates that regulation of banks has not been
based on any grand design. Rather, its foundations are built on a
Civil War need for currency and a populist suspicion of concen-
trated wealth that peaked with the Great Depression. The result of
this history was the creation of multiple state and federal regulators
and the division of commercial and investment banking activities
into separately regulated institutions. This New Deal regulatory
scheme viewed commercial banking to be a single product that
312. See Beyer, supra note 219, at xxiii (1998).
313. See id.
314. See id. See also, CRONIN, supra note 284, at 75.
315. See CRONIN, supra note 284, at 33.
316. See id. See generally Christian N. Watson, Note, The Growth of Internet-only
Banks: Brick and Mortar Branches are Feeling the "Byte", 4 N.C. BANKING INST. 345 (2000).
Most major banks now provide online access to accounts for customers.
317. See Wilson, supra note 295, at 677; CRONIN, supra note 284, at 75.
318. See Wilson, supra note 295, at 676.
319. See William B. Cahill, Regulators Discover There is No There At a "Virtual"
Bank, WALL ST. J., Sep. 1,1998, at Al.
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could be restricted to isolated institutions and intensively regulated
"functionally." Congress thought that deposit insurance would
maintain public confidence and prevent runs on banks in times of
stress.120 The exposure to that deposit insurance liability, however,
required the government to regulate every aspect of banking opera-
tions to assure that undue risks were not being incurred. At the
same time, the government removed market discipline by allowing
bank creditors (viz. depositors) to abrogate their traditional monitor-
ing function. This approach worked as long as interest rates and
economic conditions were stable and competition for bank services
could be curbed. The inflation of the 1960s and the creation of the
money market funds undermined all of those assumptions. The
bank and thrift regulators then tried to allow deposit institutions to
become market participants by lifting investment restrictions. The
regulators overlooked the dangers that deposit insurance posed
once those barriers were removed. The staid 3-6-3 bankers were re-
placed by gangs of "go-go" buccaneers who were only too happy to
gamble for their own benefit with other people's money, particu-
larly when there was no one to monitor their activities.
Put gently, functional regulation has historically been less
than a success. More importantly, modem banking no longer fits
the 1930s profile around which financial services regulation is built.
Banks are acting as conduits by generating loans that are securitized
or syndicated and then sold rather than retained as assets in the
manner of traditional commercial banking. The deposit business of
commercial banks is shrinking and is in competition with the
money market mutual funds. Branching restrictions have been re-
moved, and banks are concentrating and expanding their product
lines. The effects of these changes were aptly summarized in a 1995
Treasury Department document, which noted that:
The shareof total private financial assets held by in-
sured depository institutions has declined sharply,
from about 60 percent in 1970 to less than 35 percent
today.
320. See GARYM. WALTON& HUGH ROcKOFF, HISTORY OFTHEAMERICAN ECONOMY
513 (1994).
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" Only 15 percent of all financial assets held by house-
holds and the non-profit sector in 1994 was ac-
counted for by insured deposits.
" Recent data show that, of the 20 largest financial
firms in the United States, only 5 are commercial
banks. Moreover, a number of diversified financial
services firms own non-bank, thrift institutions, or
industrial loan companies.
" The differences between the products of banks and
non-bank financial firms have become increasingly
blurred. The emergence of similar products by dif-
ferent firms operating under different regulatory re-
gimes results in complicated competitive and
regulatory issues.
" A number of commercial banks engage in little or no
traditional banking - funding commercial loans with
deposits. Rather, they specialize in trading activities,
consumer finance, or fee-based services.
* Capital markets have become increasingly global-
ized, and financial markets in different countries
have become more interdependent.
" Technological innovations such as remote banking
and digital cash daily redefine the nature and deliv-
ery of financial services and the respective roles
played by bank and non-bank firms. For example,
the data processing firm EDS is the second largest
owner /operator of ATMs in the US32
321. Dept. of the Treasury, Memorandum for Members of the Secretary's Advi-
sory Commission on Financial Services, Joan Affleck-Smith, Director, Office of Finan-
cial Institutions Policy (Oct. 23,1995).
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The traditional commercial bank may soon be extinct. But
the banking industry is not facing change alone. Finance in general
is merging and evolving, especially as the Internet revolution affects
all financial services. Internet brokerage firms, for example are
competing with banks. Charles Schwab & Co. announced in July of
1998 that it was planning to begin online banking. This would in-
clude an online checking account that could be used to pay bills.322
E*trade Group Inc. was providing online loan applications. Other
brokers were seeking to provide insurance as well as loans online.32
"This is the biggest single threat that the commercial banks face
right now."324 In October of 1998, Prudential, the English life in-
surer, announced that it was beginning a direct banking opera-
tion.325 In October of 1998, residential mortgages were being offered
online through the Internet by several companies.32 a Consumers
were allowed to bid for mortgages and to negotiate their terms
without appearing at a bank.327 The SEC is grappling with day
traders,328 Internet trading329 and electronic communications net-
322. See John Arthers, Charles Schwab Plans Move into On-Line Banking, FIN. TIMES,
June 24,1998, at 15.
323. Charles Schwab acquired U. S. Trust in January of 2000 in an acquisition
valued at $2.9 billion. U.S. Trust is an asset manager that began business in 1853. It is
a bank that manages assets for wealthier clients. Schwab is trying to extend its client
base. See Pui-Wing Tam & Randall Smith, Schwab, Goingfor High-End Clients, Sets $2.9
Billion Stock Accord for U.S. Trust, WALL ST. J., Jan. 14,2000, at C1. Merrill Lynch has
announced it will offer federally insured deposit accounts, and E*Trade is expanding
its operations through Telebank, the Internet bank that it purchased. See Suddenly,
brokers want to be bankers, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh), Feb. 2,2000, at D2.
324. See Rebecca Buckman, Internet Brokerage Firms Break Into Banking, WALLST. J.,
July 2,1998, at C1 (quoting James Marks of Credit Suisse First Boston).
325. See Business This Week, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 17, 1998, at 5.
326. See Big Banks, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 31,1998, at 25.
327. See Robert D. Hershey, Jr., Electronic Middleman for Mortgages, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 7,1999, at BUll.
328. See Congress Unlikely to Act on SOES Anytime Soon, WALLSTREsrLETrER, Aug.
10,1998, available at 1998 WL 10243400. By 1998, thousands of day traders were using
electronic trading systems that were supplied by discount brokers. See Greg Bums,
Would-Be Tycoons Waking Up to Day Trading, CFIcAGO TRIB., Feb 15,1998, at El. They
were adding volatility to the market and were raising a host of regulatory problems.
See Ruth Simon, Day-Trading Firms' Moves That Skirt Margin-Lending Rules Are Being
Probed, WALL ST. J., June 23, 1999, at Cl; Ruth Simon & Rebecca Buckman, Massachu-
setts 'Day Trading' Action Is Latest Salvo by State, WALL ST. J., July 9,1999, at C1. Most
day traders were losing money. See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson, Day Trades: Big Growth,
Big Risks, N. Y. TIMES, July 31, 1999, at A9; Rebecca Buckman, Report on Day Trading
Firm's Accounts Finds Nearly Three-Quarters in the Red, WALL ST. J., Aug. 9,1999, at CIS.
329. The first Internet trade was conducted in 1994 by K. Aufhauser & Co., a dis-
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works ("ECNs")33° that are undermining the structure of the tradi-
tional full service brokers and threatening the role of the ex-
changes.33' The financial futures industry is facing competition
from electronic trading systems in Europe that have taken over the
lead from American exchanges.332 Exchange traded futures are also
count broker that became a part of Ameritrade Holding Corp. See The Road to the
Internet, WALL ST. J., June 2,1999, at C1. Ameritrade announced in 1997 that it would
charge only $8 in commissions for listed stock trades through the Internet. See Reb-
becca Buckman, How Far Can Online Rockets Cam Ameritrade?, WALL ST. J., Apr. 15,
1999, at C1. Charles Schwab Corp. also introduced an Internet trading system,
"e.Schwab," which offered stock trading for a commission of $29.95 for trades up to
1,000 shares. By September of 1998, Charles Schwab was executing over 50% of its
customers' trades online, an increase of some 36% from the prior year. At that time,
there were some 80 online brokerage firms. See The Future of Trading, N. Y. TIMES, Feb.
17, 1997, at Y27; The Road to the Internet, WALL ST. J., June 2, 1999, at Cl; Dave Pettit,
Logged On, The Rush to Trade Online is Changing the Nature of Individual Investing for Both
Investors Themselves and the Businesses That Serve Them, WALL ST. J., Sept 8,1998, at R6.
By 1999,200 brokerage firms were providing online trading. See Brokerage Business Will
Set Records for 1999, Decade, Industr Data Show, WALL ST. J., Dec. 29,1999, at C19. In
February of 1999, some 7.5 million accounts were trading online. That was an increase
from 1.5 million in 1996. The growth of this market was pushing up the value of the
stock of the online brokers. By 1998, Schwab's stock market value exceeded Merrill
Lynch's. See The Road to the Internet, WALL ST. J., June 2, 1999, at Cl; Joseph Kahn,
Schwab, For Now, Bests Merrill on Strength of On-Line Trading, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29,1998,
at C1.
330. Instinet Corp., the largest electronic communications network, was process-
ing 170 million shares per day in 1999. Twenty million of those trades were executed
after traditional trading hours. See Rebecca Buckman, Plan by Chicago Exchange to Offer
Extended Trading is Sign of the Times, WALL ST. J., Aug. 23,1999, at C11. Instinet was
partnering with brokers to increase its trading volume. See Rebbecca Buckman, Island
ECN Raises Capital to Become a Stock Exchange, WALL ST. J., May 11, 1999, at C20.
Goldman Sachs Group, Merrill Lynch & Co., Salomon Smith Barney, Morgan
Stanley Dean Witter and Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities formed Primex
Trading N.A. It is an electronic trading system for stocks listed on the NYSE, the
AMEX and NASDAQ. Other ECNs operating in 1999 were Archipelago, Wit Capital,
OptiMark and Easdaq. See 3 Firms Plan to Develop New System for Trading, N.Y. TIMES,
June 8,1999, at C8; John Labate, New Primex Investors, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 14,1999, at 20;
Farewell to the Floor?, THE ECONOMISr, Aug. 7,1999, at 61.
331. ECNs were reducing the market share of both the New York Stock Exchange
and NASDAQ. ECNs were handling about 29% of NASDAQ volume at the end of
1998. See Rebbecca Buckman, Island ECN Raises Capital to Become a Stock Exchange,
WALL ST. J., May 11, 1999, at C20.
These changes were worrisome to the SEC. The Chairman of the SEC an-
nounced in 1999 that he wanted to centralize all electronic trading so that all orders
would be displayed and available to everyone. See Gretchen Morgenson, S.E.C. Chief
Wants One Site for Posting All Stock Prices, N. Y. TIMES, Sept. 24,1999, at Al. In reality,
the Chairman's concerns were a recognition by the SEC that technology was defusing
the distribution of financial services and placing their distribution out of the SEC's
reach. Only by centralizing those services will the SEC be able to regulate securities
products effectively under its existing regulations.
332. Futures exchanges in the United States maintain an antiquated auction sys-
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being challenged by unregulated over-the-counter derivatives.333
The insurance industry is under assault from banks and
other segments of the financial services industry, and insurance
companies are themselves intruding into other non-traditional areas
of finance. For example, insurance companies are selling variable
insurance products that are regulated by the SEC as securities.334 A
recent reorganization of Aetna insurance company illustrates this
process. That company divided itself into two groups: health-care
insurance and "financial services." The latter unit is responsible for
a number of financial services that include many securities related
products.335 The insurance industry is also being restructured as the
communications revolution and competition from banks and bro-
ker-dealers undermine the role of the independent agents that pre-
viously were responsible for the delivery of much of the insurance
products sold in America.336 Insurance companies were making di-
tern on their floors where orders are executed manually by open outcry. See Jerry W.
Markham, The Commodity Exchange Monopoly - Reform is Needed, 48 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 977 (1991). The Chicago Board of Trade was the traditional leader in futures trad-
ing. By September of 1999, however, a German electronic exchange, Eurex, had vol-
ume almost twice that of the Chicago Board of Trade. See Edward Luce, Eurex Becones
Top Exchange, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 3,1999, at 15.
333. A report by the General Accounting Office in 1994 estimated that the no-
tional amount of OTC derivatives outstanding at the end of fiscal year 1992 was at
least $12.1 trillion, this in addition to some $5.5 trillion of foreign exchange contracts
that were being conducted largely by banks. See UNrTEDSTATESGENERALAccOUNTING
OFFICE, FINANcIAL DERIVATIVES, ACrIONS NEEDED TO PROTECTTHE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 34
(1994) available at 1994 WL 930437. Over 1,200 different financial derivative products
were being offered to institutional investors. See Albert R. Karr, Bank Regulator Signals
Move on Derivatives, WALL ST. J., April 21, 1994, at A3. They included such things as
"death backed bonds," "worthless warrants," "inverse floaters," "heaven and hell
bonds," swaptions, embedded options, synthetic indexes, synthetic stocks, barrier op-
tions, down-and-out options, deferred stop and start options, lateral options, look back
options and exploding options. See Jerry W. Markham, Protecting the Institutional In-
vestor-Jungle Predator or Shorn Lamb? 12 YALEJ. ONREG. 345,353 (1995); Elayne Sheri-
dan, SCMs Capitalize on OTC Business, FUTrURESINDUSTRYMAG., Nov./Dec. 1993, at 26,
29.
334. Because variable products are securities, the insurance industry was being
subjected to regulation by the SEC. See generally SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co.,
359 U.S. 65 (1959). Insurance companies were required to establish "separate" accounts
to hold their reserves for their securities-based products such as variable annuities and
variable life insurance. The assets held in those separate accounts were in excess of
$400 billion by 1995. This was an increase of over 30% from 1994. Common stock con-
stituted over 60% of those assets. See AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURANCE, 1996 LIFE
INSURANCE FACr BOOK 107 (1996).
335. See Carol Gentry, Aetna to Merge Global U.S. Divisions, WALL ST. J., Jan. 10,
2000, at A3.
336. Concern was being expressed that the independent insurance agent "may be
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rect sales to consumers. Allstate Insurance Company announced in
November of 1999 that it would be selling car and home insurance
directly to consumers through the Internet and over the tele-
phone. 37 Online companies were also helping consumers to buy in-
surance on the Internet. One service allowed consumers to review
the offerings of fifty major insurance companies so that they could
find the best product. This allowed consumers to compare prices.33
Financial engineering has melded commercial and invest-
ment banking together. It has blended derivatives into securities
products, and it has combined insurance with other financial ser-
vices.339 Consumers may buy these products from separate firms or
they may opt for a single provider, which may be a bank, a broker-
age firm, an insurance company or even a mutual fund.34° As one
author has noted, there have traditionally been:
relatively distinct 'borders' between what an insur-
ance company, a bank, and a securities firm could do.
Each industry operated within its compartment - the
headed the way of the milkman." See John R. Wilke & Leslie Scism, Under the Gun:
Insurance Agents Fight an Intrusion by Banks, But Other Perils Loom, WALL ST. J., Aug. 8,
1995, at Al. Insurance agencies' profits were down and their numbers had been
sharply reduced. There were some 80,000 independent insurance agencies in the
United States in the middle of the 1950s. See id. That number fell to 41,000 by the mid-
1990's. See id.
337. See Deborah Lohse, Allstate to Launch Online Sales of Car and Home Insurance,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 11, 1999, at B18.
338. See UNC Ahm Leads Revolution in Online Insurance Shopping, CHAPEL HILL
NEWS, Dec. 5,1999, at A8.
339. One writer has pointed out that, "we are witnessing the virtual disappear-
ance, nominally, of the 'life insurance agent' as this person is now being renamed 'fi-
nancial planner'." Howard J. Saks, Merging of the Life Insurance and Securities Industries
Accelerates, 25 EST. PLAN. 326 (Aug./Sep. 1998). This change was due to the fact that
many insurance agents and securities brokers were cross-licensed. See id. at 328. In-
surance companies developed securities operations while broker-dealers developed
insurance businesses. See id.
340. "Almost all the bigger brokerage houses and mutual funds now offer a
range of insurance-type products.... ." CHARLES R. MORRIs, MONEY GREED, AND RISK,
WHY FINANCIAL CRISES AND CRASHES HAPPEN 197 (1999).
Fidelity Investments was the largest mutual fund company at the end of 1999.
It was also the third largest Internet broker and was allowing its customers to trade
after regular market hours. See Fidelih to Allow After-Hours Trading, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh), Nov. 11, 1999, at D2. Fidelity was offering its customers other financial ser-
vices including an American Express gold card, as well as a Visa debit card. See John
Hechinger & Paul Beckett, Fidelih to Offer American Express Cards, WALL ST. J., May 5,
1999, at C25.
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insurance companies sold insurance, banks took
deposits; and securities firms bought and sold equi-
ties. In today's world, both insurance and securities
firms have financial instruments similar to bank de-
posits. In many countries, the banks have taken over
insurance companies and securities firms and now
offer their services. All three organizations actively
sell financial expertise around the world, using tech-
nology and wide-ranging corporate know-how.341
"And just like the commercial banks, life insurance companies are
struggling to reinvent themselves and become more like stock bro-
kerages and investment banks."342
The merger of Citicorp and the Travelers Group, which
owned Salomon Brothers and Smith Barney,3413 combined insurance,
banking, derivatives, and securities services under one giant um-
brella. This financial giant faces a multitude of regulators even
though it will be targeting the same customers for many of its ser-
vices. Those regulators include the Fed, the Treasury (Comptroller
of the Currency), various state banking commissions, the FDIC, the
SEC, state securities administrators, SIPC, the CFTC, state insurance
regulators, self-regulatory bodies (i.e., stock and commodity ex-
changes, the NASD and the NFA), and a host of others such as the
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation and the Federal Trade Com-
mission. Other financial institutions in America face similar pha-
lanxes of regulators.
The Treasury Department has noted that "[i]n light of the
changing market shares, the emergence of new financial products
and technology, and the disintegration of traditional industry and
product lines..., there needs to be a fundamental reassessment of
why and how we regulate financial firms." 3" Unfortunately, this
341. See Zagaris & MacDonald, supra note 281, at 67 n. 19.
342. See MORRIS, supra note 340, at 197.
343. See Peter Truell, Travelers-Bankers Trnst Rumor Sends Street Into Tizzy, N. Y.
TIMEs, Sep. 19,1997, at D1; Michael Siconolfi, Big Umbrella, WALLST. J., Apr. 7,1998, at
Al.
344. Dept. of the Treasury, Memorandum for Members of the Secretary's Advi-
sory Commission on Financial Services from Joan Affleck-Smith, Director, Office of
Financial Institutions Policy (Oct. 23,1995) (italics omitted).
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process has not occurred. As a result of the combining of financial
services, there is simply no basis to support the continuation of the
historical "functional" regulation that put banking, securities, insur-
ance and derivatives into isolated regulatory boxes administered by
legions of regulators. Functional regulation in no way reflects cur-
rent realities. As one bank regulator has noted, the" 'business of
banking' has changed drastically... since the National Bank Act
was enacted to support a national currency, and no one expects
banks today to be restricted to the practices that then constituted the
'business of banking.' The adaptability of the national banking sys-
tem will become increasingly important as advances in technology
and telecommunications accelerate the rate of change."345
The regulatory structure for financial services even in earlier
years was of questionable value. The stock market crash of 1929,
the great depression, disintermediation and the series of financial
crises that began in the 1960s and culminated in the S&L crisis were
not alleviated by regulation. Indeed, regulation could rightly be
blamed for accentuating those crises. History has also witnessed
dramatic changes in the nature of financial services since those
events. The growth of the institutional investor is affecting the way
the market operates. Such investors now dominate the market, and
they can trade large quantities through ECNs without the aid of an
exchange or even a broker.346 The Internet is turning financial ser-
vices into a commodity that can be purchased on the basis of price,
just as is the case for a book or a set of golf clubs. Improved search
engines and Internet access will soon allow comparison shopping
345. Letter from the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency to Margery Wax-
man, Sidley & Austin, July 23,1987.
346. One of the "most profound developments" in the securities indursty has
been the increase of stock ownership by institutions. "Only four decades ago, ninety
percent of U.S. equities were held by individuals. Today, more than half of all stock is
controlled by institutions." See NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE AND THE WHARTON
SCHOOL, THE POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF STOCK OWNERSHIPPATrERNS1(1993). Institutional
investors are in a position to "increasingly dominate United States securities markets
in terms of total assets and volume of trading (doing about 55 percent of all New York
Stock Exchange trades)." See U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, ELEC-
TRONIC BuLLs AND BEARS, U.S. SECURITIES MARKETS AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 6,
n.8 (1990). Institutions were accounting for more than 80% of all trading volume in the
stock markets in 1992. See PETERL. BERNSTEN, CAPrrAL IDEAS, THE IMPROBABLE ORIGINS
OF MODERN WALL STREET 4 (1992); JAMES E. BUCK, THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, THE
FIRST 200 YEARS 182 (1992).
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and information access on a basis that would have been inconceiv-
able only a few years before. Wal-Mart and other retailers are al-
ready trying to include financial services in their product mix.347
The repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act's restrictions on invest-
ment banking would seem to be a recognition that financial services
347. Wal-Mart was not alone. Nordstrom, Inc., a department store chain, was
granted permission to acquire a thrift so that it could offer home equity loans and
money market checking accounts. See Matt Murray, Retailers Use Legal Wrinkles to Link
Sales, Bank Services, WALL ST. J., Feb. 8,1999, at B1. Sony, "the inventor of the Walk-
man and the PlayStation," plans to begin Internet banking and has already set up a
joint venture into online securities transactions. See Bayan Rahman, Sony branches out
into internet banking venture, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 11-12, 1999, at 1. Sony also announced
that it was planning to enter into a joint venture with an online brokerage firm. See id.
After its initial public offering, the largest ever, UPS decided to expand its de-
livery business by creating a subsidiary to sell financial services that would include
credit guarantees, inventory financing, equipment leasing and factoring. See Betty
Liu, UPS Moves into Financial Services, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 6,1999, at 15. ING Group's mu-
tual fund unit is teaming with others to create links with more than 50 web retail firms
in order to promote mutual fund sales. See Aaron Lucchetti, Shop and Save? E-Tailers
Allow Buyers To Add Fund Investments to Their Carts, WALL ST. J., Dec. 21, 1999, at Cl.
Merrill Lynch was also opening up its online services to allow customers to buy non-
financial products such as books from Barnes & Noble and wine from "virtual vine-
yards." See Charles Gasparino & Randall Smith, Internet Trades Put Merrill Bulls on
Horns of a Dilemma, WALL ST. J., Feb. 12,1999, at Cl.
One need only have visited the Harris Teeter grocery store in Chapel Hill at
end of the last century to see how far the financial services revolution has spread
across traditional lines. CCB, a large North Carolina Bank, has a kiosk selling a broad
array of financial services including checking and asset management accounts, mutual
funds, and an ATM is available for cash withdrawals. A few steps away is a display
selling a software package by E*Trade, an online broker, that allows consumers to
trade stocks and other securities on the Internet for $49.95.
This revolution has been underway for some time. Sears Roebuck & Co. had
earlier tried to trade "stocks and socks." Sears bought Coldwell Banker in October of
1981. Coldwell Banker was then the largest real estate firm in the United States. See
Thomas J. Lueck, Sears to Buy Coldwell Banker in Big Expansion, WALLST. J., Oct. 6,1981,
at A2. Three days later, Sears' agreed to buy Dean Witter, Reynolds, the fifth largest
securities broker. See Paul A. Gigot & Thomas J. Lueck, Financial Forays, Sears Expan-
sion Brings Increased Competition to Bankers and Brokers, WALLST. J., Oct. 12,1981, at Al.
It was Sears strategy to become the largest financial services company in the United
States. See TIM CARRINGTON, THEYEARTHEYSOLD WALLSTREET212 (1985); Greg Bums,
Not Many Mistakes in Century of Success, CHICAGO SuN-TIMES, Sep. 30, 1992, at 62.
Oddly, Sears had little trouble selling stocks. Instead, it was foundering on its dry
goods business. In September of 1992, Sears sold Dean Witter Financial Services
Group, Coldwell Banker, and the Sears Savings Bank. These sales were necessary to
help Sears pay off $3 billion in corporate debt incurred from losses in its catalogue and
store sales. See Mary Ellen Podmolik, Sears Announces Breakup, CHICAGO SuN-TIMES,
Sep. 29, 1992, at 8, available in 1992 WL 3487866. At that time, Dean Witter was the
third largest brokerage firm in the country and was posting record profits. See gener-
ally David Dishneau, Sears Sheds Brokerage, Real Estate Units, ASSOCIATED PRESS, available
in 1992 WL 5318401 (Sep. 29,1992).
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can no longer be placed in separate boxes by Congressional fiat.348
But that repeal is really only the beginning of the process for creat-
ing a regulatory structure that is appropriate for modem financial
services. Other than for reasons of expediency, it is difficult to jus-
tify Congress' decision to continue and endorse this functional regu-
latory structure.
The efficacy of the present functional system is being called
into question in other ways. The derivative dealers are virtually un-
regulated. Federal regulators are seeking to continue the current
non-regulated environment for over-the-counter derivatives.349
Synthetic products can replicate securities markets and operate out-
side the reach of the CFTC and SEC. A well-known economist re-
cently listed fifteen different ways to take a stock market position
without buying the stock, and many of those methods involved un-
regulated activity.350 The Task Group on Regulation of Financial
Services that was chaired by Vice President George Bush in 1984
made some effort to address the need for changes in the regulatory
structure. s1 The Task Group concluded that "the American finan-
cial market is the central nervous system of the economy"352 and
that there was too much regulation. Seven federal financial agencies
were regulating financial services, and they had over 38,000 full-
time employees who were intruding into virtually every aspect of
finance.35 3 The Task Group cautioned, however, that there was dan-
ger in concentrating regulatory authority into a single regulator.
The Task Group's report noted that "[t]hroughout American his-
tory, no single government authority has ever been entrusted with
348. As one author has noted: "The long-term regulatory tendency will be toward
a more sharply tiered system of oversight, based not on institution type but on the
financial function being performed, the presence of systemic risk, and the relative
competence and power of the parties to a transaction." MORRIS, supra note 340, at 241.
349. See Gerard Baker, Greenspan wants derivatives freed up, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 11,
2000, at 11.
350. See id. at 238.
351. See BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM: THE REPORT OF THE TASK GROUP ON REGULATION
OF FINANCIAL SERVICES (Nov. 14,1984). The Task Group included the Secretary of the
Treasury, the Attorney General, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget
and the Chairman of the Fed, as well as the heads of several other agencies regulating
financial services.
352. See id. at 8.
353. See id.
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regulatory authority over all American banks." 354
The Bush Task Force had little effect on the regulatory struc-
ture. The Treasury Department submitted legislative proposals in
1991 to rationalize bank regulation, but it too was ignored. The
Clinton administration submitted a report to Congress in 1993 that
proposed the establishment of a Federal Banking Commission that
would have regulated all FDIC-insured depository institutions and
their holding companies and affiliates. This new agency would
have combined the functions of the Comptroller of the Currency,
the Fed, the FDIC and the Office of Thrift Supervision. The Fed
would have continued its role in administering monetary policy.
This proposal was ignored.355
In connection with the Clinton administration's review of fi-
nancial services, The Chicago Mercantile Exchange ("CME"') pro-
posed the creation of a single department for financial services
regulation.356 That proposal would have continued functional regu-
lation in various sub-departments. The CME proposal was still-
born. The government in Great Britain has opted for a more central
based regulator that cuts across financial service product lines.357
That model will undoubtedly be closely followed for possible appli-
cation here. Nevertheless, the creation of such a body raises several
concerns. It could stifle competition, it could over-regulate and
cause a loss of competitive position in international markets. Such a
monolithic body could try to become a Japanese Ministry of Finance
354. See id.
355. See MACEY & MILLER, supra note 136, at 69-71.
356. See CHICAGO MERCANTILE EXCHANGE, FINANCIAL REGULATION FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY (1995).
357. The Labor government in England gave the Bank of England authority to set
interest rates. See Labour's Good Start, THE ECONOMIST, May 10, 1997, at 14. At the same
time, the government removed the bank's long-held authority to supervise other banks
in England. That authority was transferred to the Securities and Investments Board,
which was already exercising supervisory authority over brokerage firms. Financial
regulation in the United Kingdom was then centralized. The government announced
that it was planning to place more responsibility on a Financial Services Authority and
less on self-regulation for securities and other financial services. See Labour Turns to the
City, THE ECONOMIsT, May 24,1997, at 14. The Financial Services Authority was to be a
"super regulator." See Edward Luce, London Stock Exchange Faces Curbs, FIN. TIMES,
Oct. 4,1999, at 1. It will take responsibility for the Securities and Investments Board,
The Securities and Futures Association and the Personal Investments Authority, as
well as the former regulatory functions of the Bank of England. See Richard Dedman,
Inside Track, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 7,2000, at 10.
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and "plan" the economy by hiring brilliant bureaucrats to make eco-
nomic decisions for millions of consumers who, if given the choice,
would probably prefer to make those decisions themselves.
A better approach would be to abandon the functional prod-
uct based regulatory model entirely. The merging of financial ser-
vices and the blending of products makes such an approach
outmoded. Instead, attention should be directed to the realities of
the marketplace. Who needs regulation and who does not are the
first issues to be addressed. The securities industry has long recog-
nized that institutional and other sophisticated market participants
do not need the same protections as the proverbial widows and or-
phans of the world. Consequently, sophisticated "accredited" in-
vestors are exempted from much of the onerous regulation imposed
on those firms dealing with "retail" customers. 8 That approach
should be carried across all financial services.3 9 This could mean,
for example, that financial institutions could open unregulated de-
posit accounts with a bank that would not be subject to reserve re-
quirements or have deposit insurance.36°  The sophisticated
depositors using these accounts could make their own credit risk
358. See Jerry W. Markham, Protecting the Institutional Investor- Jungle Predator or
Shorn Lamb?, 12 YALE J. ONREG. 345 (1995). "It was understood, even before the en-
actment of the Securities Act of 1933, that institutional investors did not need the man-
datory disclosure system of that Act to protect themselves when acquiring securities.
These investors could'fend for themselves'." See JOEL SELIGMAN, THETRANSFORMATION
OF WALL STREET, A HISTORY OF THE SECURITIFS AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN
CORPoRATE FINANCE 570 (1995).
359. Financial services are converging at both the retail and institutional levels.
See Finance and Economics: The new financiers, THE EcONoMIST, September 4,1999, at 69.
This means that functional regulation is no longer practical for either retail customers
or institutional distributors.
360. The H.R. 10 restrictions on investment banking contained a provision that
would have allowed the creation of something called "wholesale financial companies"
("woofies"). See H.R. 10, 105th Cong. (1998). The bill would have allowed investment
banking firms to operate a bank that would only have institutions as customers and
would have no deposit insurance. The legislation, however, would have imposed
capital and other restrictions on the operations of woofies and would have subjected
them to regulation by the bank regulators. The investment banks advocating this
legislation lost interest in this proposal, and the provision was dropped from the
legislation that was eventually enacted. See Leslie Wayne, Push for Wholesale Banks
Stalls in Overhaul of Law, N.Y. TIMES, July 7,1999, at C2. Nevertheless, such a format,
sans regulation, would be an appropriate vehicle for isolating institutional activities in
a holding company structure that contains retail customer operations. Investment
banks and broker-dealers are already using special purpose, bankruptcy remote
affiliates to handle over-the-counter derivatives business.
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assessment and hedge against defaults through derivatives."' The
banks offering these accounts could place them in a separate sub-
sidiary or those institutional deposits could be subordinated to the
claims of insured retail depositors. Similarly, banks and brokerage
firms could continue to underwrite and sell securities and deriva-
tives to accredited investors without registration.362
Banks should be able to conduct proprietary trading without
undue regulatory hindrance. They should be able to participate in
ECNs and compete fully with brokerage firms. At the same time,
banks should be stripped of regulatory protections such as those
that preclude commercial firms like Wal-Mart from competing for
retail customer deposits. There is no economic basis for such artifi-
cial restraints. Banks and other institutions should be disciplined by
the market just like the rest of the economy. Banks and other insti-
tutions have the wherewithal to make credit assessments and to ne-
gotiate and enforce any protections that might be needed. The role
of regulators in financial transactions conducted among institutions
would be left to systemic concerns. That would largely involve
providing liquidity in times of crisis and monitoring monetary pol-
icy.36
3
361. There is an active market for credit derivatives that allow participants to buy
or sell credit risk. Default swaps are the most popular of these instruments. Under
such agreements, if the borrower defaults, the seller will take over the debt at face
value. See Credit Derivatives, Fixing the Holes, THE ECONoMisT, Aug. 14, 1999, at 61; Is
There Money in Misfortune?, TsH ECONOMISr, July 18, 1998, at 67. This not to say that
risk has been eliminated with these instruments. Concern is being expressed as to
what constitutes a default and what exactly is to be paid when there was a default. See
Credit Derivatives, THE EcONoMIsT, Dec. 5,1998, at 101. Most large financial firms have
their own credit departments and internal controls to protect themselves from undue
counter-party exposures. They are backstopped by the rating agencies. See generally
Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets?: Two Thumbs Down for the
Credit Rating Agencies, 77 Wash U.L.Q. 619 (1999) (discussing role and limitations of
rating agencies).
362. A former SEC Commissioner has suggested a regulatory structure that
would divide regulation into systemic consumer protection, but he would add two
more agencies that would regulate deposit insurance and market structure. See MOR-
RiS, supra note 340, at 239.
363. For example, the Fed stepped in to assure liquidity for clearing firms during
the Stock Market Crash of 1987. See GORDON, supra note 48, at 45; Jerry W Markham &
Rita McCloy Stephanz, The Stock Market Crash of 1987- The United States Looks at New
Recommendations, 76 GEO. L.J. 1993, 2010 (1988). A more recent example of the Fed's
role in addressing systemic concerns already exists in its handling of the Long Term
Capital. Management ("LTCM") crisis. LTCM is a hedge fund that lost 90% of its $4.8
billion in capital in September of 1998 as a result of its trading positions. See Business
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The regulatory role of the government should otherwise be
limited to protecting small investors. This would involve the prose-
cution of fraudulent sales practices that are directed to unsophisti-
cated retail customers. This could include such things as
prohibitions against "churning" of securities and commodity ac-
counts, "twisting" of insurance policies, "switching" of mutual
funds, fraudulent claims of performance and similar matters affect-
ing retail financial services." Another aspect of this regulation
would involve protection of customer funds that are on deposit
with a retail financial services firm. This would include such things
This Week, THE ECONOMIST, Sep. 26,1998, at 7. See also David Barboza & Jeff Gerth, On
Regulating Derivatives, N. Y. TIMfS, Dec. 15, 1998, at C1. Several large financial firms
had invested in LTCM, and numerous banks had loaned LTCM large amounts so that
it could further leverage itself. See Michael Siconolfi, Anita Raghavan & Mitchell
Pacelle, All Bets Are Off, WALL ST. J., Nov. 16,1998, at Al. LTCM encountered massive
losses as a result of turmoil in the market. The Fed became concerned that the failure
of LTCM could result in a market panic. See LISA ENDuCH, GOLDMAN SACHS, THE CUL-
TURE OF SuccEss 265 (1999). The Fed then pressured the banks and others, including
Merrill Lynch, Travelers Corp., Goldman Sachs and J.P. Morgan & Co., to put up more
than $3.5 billion to save LTCM. See Anita Raghavan & Mitchell Pacelle, To The Rescue?,
WALL ST. J., Sep. 24,1998, at Al.
The LTCM affair also illustrates why the existing overlapping structure is in
need of replacement. The CFTC used that event as the basis for launching an effort to
regulate OTC derivatives and to set the stage for preempting SEC regulation over OTC
derivative dealers. See David Barboza and Jeff Gerth, Who's In Charge? Agency Infight-
ing and Regulatory Uncertainty, N. Y. TIMES, Dec. 15,1998, at C14; Michael Schroeder,
Born, Again, WALL ST. J., Nov. 3,1998, at Al. The Fed, the SEC and the Treasury De-
partment opposed the CFTC inquiry because of concerns that it would destabilize
markets. See Michael Schroeder, CFTC Chairwoman Won't Halt Study of OTC Derivatives
Rules, WALL ST. J., June 11, 1998, at Cl; Michael Schroeder, Treasury, Fed and SEC Ap-
peal to Halt CFTC Plan to Review OTC Derivatives, WALL ST. J., June 8, 1998, at BliC.
Congress was forced to enact legislation to stop the CFTC. See generally David Bar-
boza & Jeff Gerth, I'ho's In Charge? Agency Infighting and Regulatory Uncertainty, N. Y.
TIMES, Dec. 15,1998, at C14. In the meantime, the SEC spent a great deal of effort to
create something called "Broker-Dealer Lite" that was intended to create a registration
category with reduced regulation. The OTC derivative dealers had structured their
operations to avoid more onerous SEC regulation, sometimes by locating their activi-
ties off-shore. The SEC thought that reduced regulation would entice these dealers
back into the regulatory fold. As of January 10, 2000, only one firm had registered
with the SEC as a Broker-Dealer Lite.
364. One goal of consumer protection should be education. All too many finan-
cial frauds involve claims of exorbitant profits with limited risk. No one should be
allowed to graduate from high school without a basic understanding of the relation-
ship between risk and reward. Just as every student knows that 2 X 2 = 4, every
schoolchild should be taught that a claim of large profits without commensurate risk is
not possible. Similarly, high school students should be taught the time value of
money, how leverage works and the effects of commissions and fees on their invest-
ment returns. They also need to understand the nature of investments in mutual
funds, stocks and bonds, including their attendant risks.
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as capital and reserve requirements (which are now converging as
VAR and similar risk assessment programs become popular),365 seg-
regation of funds and administration of deposit insurance. Truth-
in-lending, fair credit reporting and collection practices, equal credit
opportunity and similar laws would fall under this part of the regu-
latory structure. Trade practices would be another aspect of con-
sumer protection. This would include such things as insider
trading, manipulation and other market practice issues.
All of this retail regulation could be conducted by a single
regulator, but the brief of that agency must be consumer protection.
It should not be the dictation of market structure, the determination
of who can market particular financial services, or the form of the
financial services to be offered. Further, even retail consumer regu-
lation should give way to market discipline whenever possible. For
example, the government's exposure from the risks associated with
deposit insurance should be laid off on private insurers and that
cost should be passed on to the consumers receiving the benefit
through the retail outlets for those services. Many broker-dealers
already carry private account insurance for amounts in excess of
those covered by SPIC. For example, Charles Schwab recently an-
nounced that it had arranged for insurance from the Travelers
Casualty and Security Company of America that would provide an
additional $900,000 of coverage for cash in a securities account and
for coverage for the net equity value of a securities account in excess
of the SPIC coverage.366 The existence of a credit derivatives market
should facilitate this risk shifting process. In addition, as one Fed
official has suggested, even unsophisticated consumers should be
given the option of buying unregulated products.367 That proposal
365. See Jerry W. Markham, The CFTC Net Capital Rule - Should a More Risk-
Based Approach be Adopted, 71 CHICAGo-KENT L. REV. 1091, 1097-99 (1996).
366. See CHARLES SCHWAB, THE SCHWAB INVESTOR, Vol. 4, issue 1 (2000) (special
edition).
367. See Oliver I. Ireland, Fed Associate General Counsel, New Regulatory Models
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is not as revolutionary as it sounds. Consumers already have the
choice of depositing their funds either in an uninsured money mar-
ket account or in an insured bank or thrift account. Such choices
should be expanded.
IV. CONCLUSION
Banking and other financial services have come a long way
since Alexander Hamilton and Robert Morris proposed the creation
of a central bank. In the meantime, the country has struggled al-
most continuously with the proper role of government in the regula-
tion of banking and other financial services. As a result of that
history, "functional" regulation has been imposed in which particu-
lar groups of state and/or federal regulators are assigned the duty
of regulating specified activities conducted by specific entities such
as commercial banks, insurance companies, futures commission
merchants and broker-dealers. The revolution in finance that oc-
curred in the last quarter of the twentieth century, however, has
rendered such a system obsolete. Financial services are now being
offered across those traditional functional and institutional lines.
The repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act's investment banking restric-
tions only underscores this change. Although Congress wants to
keep regulation in its traditional boxes, those boxes no longer exist.
The growth of financial service offerings on the Internet will only
accentuate the diffusion of those services. At the same time, many
consumer financial services are escaping regulation almost entirely
because they do not fit traditional norms. Reform is needed that
will take into account the ongoing restructuring of financial ser-
vices.
Institutional vs. Functional Regulation, Paper presented at the Annual Chicago-Kent
Conference on Derivatives Transactions (Oct. 1999).
2000]
286 NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE [Vol. 4
